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Predictors of Municipal Bankruptcies and State
Intervention Programs: An Exploratory Study
Laura N. Coordes' & Thom Reily"
ABSTRACT

Why do some strugglingcities file for bankruptcy while others, facing simiar
circumstances, do not? This Article builds on the literature examining the causes
and consequences ofmunicipal fiscal distress by exploring specific factors that lead
municipalities to seek help from the state and federal government. Viewing
municipal opportunities and constraints through political, economic, and legal
lenses, this Article helps to explain the nuances ofmunicival decision making.
After identifiing eight factors that may serve as predctors of municipal
insolvency, the authors studied cities in Fiscal distress with an eye toward
uncovering the circumstances that led each of these cities into and-ifapplicableout of theirfinancialpredcaments. Union density unfunded pension iabilty, and
financial mismanagement were the three most prevalent factors in the authors'
sample population. The analysis suggests that scholars and policymakers should
focus their efforts on using bankruptcyrebefin conjunction with state aidprograms
in order to address these primary sources of municipal distress in a more
comprehensive manner.

' Associate Professor, Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law. Many
thanks to Karen Bradshaw, Kaipo Matsumura, Troy Rule, Erin Scharff, Cathy Hwang, and Juliet
Moringiello for their advice and suggestions on previous drafts. Special thanks to Madison Levine for
research assistance.
n Director, Morrison Institute for Public Policy and Professor, School of Public Affairs, Arizona
State University. Many thanks to my research assistant, Larry Gulliford, for his work on this
manuscript.
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INTRODUCTION

Chicago and Detroit are alike in many ways. Both iconic Midwestern cities
have publicly struggled with crime, corruption, and financial instability. In recent
years, ratings agencies have downgraded the credit ratings for both cities.' And,
although quite different in terms of size and industry concentration, both cities
share many of the same financial problems, including mismanagement of finances
and high, unfunded pension liabilities. 2 Detroit chose to address its problems
through bankruptcy, while Chicago-at least so far-has not. This prompts the
following question: why do some cities file for bankruptcy, while others, facing
similar financial problems, do not?
This question has multiple potential answers. One reason that municipal
bankruptcy is not utilized consistently across cities is that access to bankruptcy
relief differs across the fifty states. Although federal law allows any entity meeting
the definition of a "municipality" to seek bankruptcy protection using Chapter 9 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, municipalities also need specific authorization from the
states in which they are located before they can file for such relief.' Twenty-four
states conditionally or unconditionally authorize municipal bankruptcy access, three
provide limited authorization, two prohibit the practice outright, and the
remainder provide no express authorization.' This patchwork of access provisions,
combined with concerns about the municipal bankruptcy process itselfs leads many
municipalities to utilize alternative fiscal relief remedies, even if their state does
provide them with access to bankruptcy.
Another reason is that municipal bankruptcy is rare, and therefore somewhat of
an unthinkable event. Between 1980 and 2008, only 216 Chapter 9 cases were
filed. 6 Even during the Great Recession, when bankruptcy filings as a whole rose,
municipal bankruptcies remained scarce: from 2008 to 2012, only one out of every
1,668 local governments filed for bankruptcy, and most of these filings were small

1DetroitCreat
RatingDowngradedAgain, S&P Cuts General ObgationDebt Furtherinto Junk
Status, REUTERS (Jul. 19, 2013), http://www.huffsngtonpost.comn/2013/07/19/detroit-credit-rating-

downgrade-sp-debt-junk n_3622643.html [https://perma.cc/R4EA-54ZM]; Fitch Cuts Chicago
Credt Rating in Wake of Pension Rulng, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2016, 5:23 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/artide/chicago-ratings-outlook-idUSL2N170121
[https://perma.cc/R9RUJEMG].
2 See case studies infia Part II.
3 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2016) (providing for state authorization).
4 Cory Eucalitto et al., Municipal Bankruptcy: An Overview for Local Offcials, AM. LEGIS.
EXCHANGE COUNCIL (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.alec.org/artide/municipal-bankruptcy-anoverview-for-local-officials/ [https://perma.cc/K8FM-Y2C4].
s SeeJohn Gramlich, MunicipalBankruptcyExplained: What it Means to Fie for Chapter 9, PEW
CHARITABLE

TR.

(Nov.

22,

2011),

http-//www.pewtrusts.org/en/research -and-

analysis/blogs/stateline/2011/11/22/municipal-bankruptcy-explained-what-it-means-to-file-forchapter-9 [https://perma.cc/2L6L-U3R5].
6 Keren Deal et al., A Descriptive Case Study of the Greene County, Alabama Bankruptcy, 21
PUB. BUDGETING, ACcT. &FIN. MGMT., 337, 338 (2009).
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utility authorities and special taxing districts, rather than cities and towns.7 Still, a
small yet significant wave of high-profile filings occurred on the heels of the Great
Recession, testing municipal bankruptcy's efficacy and bringing more attention to
the process. If cities and towns continue to utilize Chapter 9 in the wake of the
recession, municipal bankruptcy may begin to offer more predictability and
consistency than, for example, an ad hoc state program hastily created to address
municipal distress.
Studying how municipalities choose to overcome distress, whether through
bankruptcy or otherwise, however, is complicated. Indeed, a vast array of different
state laws impact a municipality's fiscal health. And, to date, the municipal
decision-making process has remained largely inaccessible. Thus, to gain a better
understanding of this process, this Article presents a novel framework for studying
municipal choices relating to fiscal distress. Through case studies of nineteen cities
that have experienced distress over the past eight years, this Article examines
factors that contribute to a municipality's fiscal health, as well as factors that
influence a municipality's options when it comes to distress relief. In so doing, this
Article contributes both to the literature focusing on the use and efficacy of

Bankrupt Cities, Municip
es List and Map, GOVERNING (Nov. 7
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/municipal-cities-counties-bankruptcies-and-defaults.html

[https://perma.cc/B29M-U8FC].

2014),
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municipal bankruptcy' and to the literature studying how fiscal crises have led
municipalities to seek relief in the first place.'
Studying municipal decision-making is critical to determining what types of
fiscal relief will be effective for any given municipality. Using the framework
developed in this Article, scholars and policymakers can better understand and
identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chapter 9 relief vis-a-vis various

state programs for each particular municipality. Importantly, this Article's case
studies and findings provide strong evidentiary support for the notion that Chapter
9 municipal bankruptcy and state relief can work together and need not be viewed
as mutually exclusive or as working at cross purposes.
Part I of this Article traces the historical development of Chapter 9 bankruptcy
and state programs and provides an overview of the authors' methodology and
approach to the issues raised in this Introduction. Part II is this Article's analytical
heart, presenting case studies that showcase key examples of the various city-state

&

' See general/y Laura Napoli Coordes, RestructuringMuni al Bankruptcy, 2016 UTAH L. REV.
307 (2016) (expressing concerns that municipal bankruptcy law in practice is out of touch with the
broader goals of the bankruptcy system); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Fideralism, Political Will, and
Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CI. L. REV. 281 (2012) (studying the power of
bankruptcy courts and arguing that they should be allowed to impose resource adjustments on
municipalities); Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., GovernanceReform and theJudicialRole in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150 (2016) (contending that bankruptcy must also address
governance dysfunction within the municipality to be effective as a long-term remedy); Omer Kimhi,
Chapter9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search ofa Problem, 27 YALE J. REG. 351 (2010)
(observing some of bankruptcy's harmful effects and advocating for proactive state oversight in lieu of
bankruptcy); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CI. L. REV. 425 (1993) (describing how municipal
bankruptcy could be used by courts to force prudent yet politically unpopular decisions on local
officials).
9
See generally, Richard F. Callahan & Mark Pisano, Bankruptcy- The Divergent Cases of the City
and the County of San Bernardino, 14 PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 84, 84 (2014) (examining municipal
bankruptcy's effects); Deal, supra note 6 (examining municipal bankruptcy effects); Reynolds Farley,
The Bankruptcy of Detroit: What Role Did Race Play?, 14 CITY & COMMUNITY 118 (2015)
(examining municipal bankruptcy effects); Rebecca Hendrick & Andrew Crosby, Does Bankruptcy
RealfMatter? The Solvency ofMunicipal Governments in the ChicagoMetropobtan Region, 14 PUB.
FIN. & MGMT. 48 (2014) (acknowledging the benefits that a holistic study of insolvent governments
can provide in understanding the differences between fiscal crises that result in bankruptcy and those
that do not); Keeok Park, To File or Not to Fde: The Causes ofMunicpal Bankruptcy in the United
States, 16 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 228 (2004) (developing a theory as to why
municipalities file for bankruptcy and suggesting that governments in municipal bankruptcy be explored
separately from those in severe fiscal distress); Jamie Peck, PushingAusterity- State Failure, Municipal
Bankruptcy and the Crises of FiscalFederalism in the USA, 7 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS, ECON.
SOC'Y 17 (2013) (studying this area after the 2008 financial crisis); Stefano Rossi & Hayong Yun, What
Drives Financial Reform? Economics and Politics of the State-Level Adoption of Municipal
Bankruptcy
Laws,
(Dec.
2015)
(unpublished
paper)
(available
at
httpf//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2698665
[https-//perma.cc/6668-RQEB])
(analyzing state adoption of municipal bankruptcy laws through the lenses of economic and political
theories of financial reform); Akheil Singla et al., Blind, Broke, and Bedlam: Differentiating Fiscal
Stress from Bankruptcy in California, 14 PUB. FIN. & MGMT. 306 (2014) (finding that the fiscal stress
in California cities that filed for bankruptcy was not demonstrably more extreme than conditions found
in similar California cities that did not file).
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interactions that influence municipal decision-making. Part III puts the authors'
findings into context and discusses their implications. Part IV concludes by
emphasizing how this Article's framework will contribute to future research in this
area. Finally, an Appendix describes the case studies not discussed in Part II.
I. BACKGROUND

This Part of this Article begins by outlining the historical development of
Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the concurrent rise in state relief
programs. The authors then describe their approach and methodology to
examining predictors of both municipal distress and distress relief. An
understanding of these background elements paves the way for the analysis in the
subsequent Parts of this Article.
A. Chapter9's HistoricalDevelopment
In response to lawsuits filed against municipal officials during the Great
Depression, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act in the early 1930s to allow
cities and towns to adjust their debts.'o To overcome the problem of a "holdout"
creditor--one who refused to agree to an otherwise consensual debt adjustmentCongress permitted a judge to approve a bankruptcy plan as long as a supermajority of creditors agreed to it." Because contracts cannot be modified on a nonconsensual basis under state law, Congress implemented its powers to create
bankruptcy laws, and, thus, created Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. 12
Bankruptcy was a desirable solution because it offered a streamlined mechanism for
debt resolution. Outside of bankruptcy, however, creditors remained free to pursue
their individual interests without thinking about the creditor group as a whole,
which could be detrimental to parties."
But, despite bankruptcy's benefits, Congress' first attempt at a municipal
bankruptcy law was unsuccessful, and the United States Supreme Court declared
the first iteration of municipal bankruptcy laws unconstitutional in 1936.1
Specifically, the Court held that the amendments contravened the Tenth
Amendment, which reserves undelegated powers to the states, because the
amendments allowed federal judges to interfere with municipalities' contractual
obligations."s In response, Congress passed a revised set of amendments providing

1o Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-SovereignDebt, 121 YALE LJ.
888, 923 (2012).
n Vincent S. J. Buccola, Who Does Bankruptcy?Mapping Pension Impairment in Chapter 9, 33
REv. BANKING &FIN. L. 585, 592-93 (2014).
0
McConnell & Picker, supranote 8, at 427-28.
David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should BankruptcyBe an Option (forPeople, Places, or Things)?, 55
WM. &MARY L. REv. 2217, 2235-36 (2014).
1 Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 532 (1936).
1s Id. at 530-32.
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This time, the Supreme Court

upheld the amendments, noting that Congress had successfully balanced the need
for federal relief with protections for state sovereignty.17
Although these Bankruptcy Act amendments were originally intended to be
temporary, Congress made them permanent in 1946." In subsequent years,
Congress continued to revise Chapter 9: once in the 1970s, during New York
City's fiscal crisis, and most recently in 1994.1' The 1994 amendments, however,
are significant-they require states to specifically authorize their municipalities to
file for bankruptcy.20 The 1994 amendments effectively reversed the baseline for
state authorization: prior to the amendments, silence in the law constituted assent
to filing; following the amendments, however, anything less than explicit
authorization is deemed to prohibit a municipal bankruptcy filing. 21
Structurally, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code borrows heavily from Chapter
11, the chapter typically used to reorganize businesses. Today, Chapter 9 is used to
adjust the debts of general purpose municipalities, such as cities and towns, as well
as special purpose districts, such as hospitals or water authorities.
B. State Programsand Their Limitations
Not all states permit their municipalities to utilize chapter 9, and even those
that do often also have alternative, state-designed intervention or rescue programs
available. Such programs vary widely from state to state. General characteristics,
however, may include provisions of state aid to the municipality,' the appointment
of an emergency manager to temporarily run a city or town, 24 or the creation of a
state-run board to oversee the municipality's finances. 2 5 To the extent a state in this
Article's sample has a developed, alternative system available for its municipalities,
this Article describes that system in the case studies below.
Although the quality and composition of state programs vary considerably, all
state programs are somewhat limited in their ability to address municipal fiscal
crises. For example, states are generally viewed as prohibited from impairing

'6 Act of Aug. 16, 1937, 50 Stat. 653.
'7 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27,51 (1938).
15 In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R 770, 778 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).
"
M. Heith Frost, States as Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Gatekeepers: Federalsm, Specifc
Authorization, andProtection ofMumcipal Economic Health, 84 Miss. L.J. 817, 829-33 (2015).

1 Id. at 831-33.
d.

21

2 Skeel, supra note 13, at 2220.
23 See, e.g., The State Role in Local Government I1nancialDistress,PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Jul.

2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2013/07/23/pew state role inlocal-government-financial_d
istress.pdf [https*//perma.cc/2ZDZ-QFTF].
24 See, e.g., id. (describing Michigan's emergency manager system).
2 See, e.g., id. (describing New Hampshire's financial control board for the city of Manchester in

1921).
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contractual obligations on a non-consensual basis,' and Section 903 of the
Bankruptcy Code similarly prohibits states from effectuating a comprehensive debt
composition.2 7 Thus, as the Supreme Court has recently confirmed, states cannot
enact their own bankruptcy law.' In addition to legal limitations, however, states
also often encounter practical difficulties in managing intervention programs due to
their own fiscal limitations. If a state, for example, is struggling with its own
pension burdens or cannot pay its own debts, such state may not have the funds to
provide additional assistance to cities in fiscal distress.
C. Approach and Methodology
The authors began their study of municipal fiscal distress by identifying a set of
factors they hypothesized would serve as key predictors of municipal behavior. The
authors then created a sample of municipalities to study by identifying cities with a
population greater than 50,000 that had encountered fiscal distress. The authors
chose the population floor in order to increase their chances of access to publicly
available information about the cities, as well as to be able to focus their study on
the effects of fiscal distress on cities with a significant population. To isolate those
cities that had experienced fiscal distress, the authors examined the credit ratings of
municipal bond issuances, as well as municipalities that had either filed for
bankruptcy or utilized a state intervention program.
Thus, the authors began by acquiring a list of U.S. cities with a population of at
least 50,000 from the U.S. Census Bureau's population estimate.' The 601 cities
that fit this criterion formed the authors' initial sample. Separately, the authors
identified the thirteen municipalities that had filed for bankruptcy during and after
the 2008 financial crisis.30 Of these, only four cities with populations of 50,000 or
higher had filed.
The authors next accessed municipal bond rating data for each of the cities
from the Electronic Municipal Market Access ("EMMA") web database provided
by the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board ("MSRB").' To encompass the
timing of the Great Recession and its aftermath, the authors gathered data for each
of the cities in their sample using the time frame of 01/01/2007 to 12/01/2015.
2
6 SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
27

See 1 U.S.C. § 903 (2016).
See generally Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (holding that
Puerto Rico is a "State" for purposes of bankruptcy preemption).
' U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Resident Populationfor IncorporatedPlaces of
50,000
or
More,
FACTFINDER
(2015),
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xbtm.lpid=PEP_2015_PEPANN
RES&src=pt [https-//perma.cc/C5SY-G8GH].
Mike Maciag, How Rare are Municipal Bankruptcys?, GOVERNING (Jan. 24, 2013),
3
http://www.governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/municipal-bankruptcy-rate-and-state-lawlimitations.html [https://perma.cc/7XVD-NNUC].
3
RULEMAKING
BD.,
Electronc
Municipal Market
Access,
MUN.
SEC.
http*//www.emma.msrb.org [https://perma.cc/BEY3-WUU8] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
28
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After pulling the database records from the website, the authors manually
examined each record to observe the ratings corresponding to the municipal bonds
issued by each city in the sample. The authors consulted ratings from each of the
four ratings agencies whenever applicable: Fitch, the Kroll Bond Rating Agency
("KBRA"), Moody's, and Standard & Poor ("S&P"). The authors noted bond
issuances with below investment grade ratings for each of the cities, including the
four that had filed for bankruptcy since 2008. The authors also noted occurrences
of long-term debt ratings on bonds at or lower than BBB+ or Baal on the
applicable scale. This yielded a list of nineteen cities with populations greater than
50,000 that have either filed for bankruptcy during the period of time in question,
issued below investment grade rated bonds during the period of time in question,
or both. This list of nineteen cities, located within thirteen states, formed the
authors' new sample:
Table 1: Population and Bankruptcy Status
City Name

State

Glendale

Arizona

Population
Estimate (as of
July 1, 2014)
237,517

Irvine

California

248,531

N

San Bernardino

California

215,213

Y

Stockton

California

302,389

Y

Vallejo

California

120,228

Y

New Britain

Connecticut

72,878

N

West Haven
Chicago

Connecticut

54,905

N

Illinois

2,722,389

N

Hammond

Indiana

78,384

N

New Orleans

Louisiana

384,320

N

Baltimore

Maryland

622,793

N

Detroit

Michigan

680,250

Y

North Las Vegas
Bayonne

Nevada

230,788

N

NewJersey

65,975

N

Jersey City
Niagara Falls

NewJersey
New York

262,146
49,219

N

Utica

New York

61,332

N

Scranton

Pennsylvania

75,281

N

Providence

Rhode Island

179,154

N

Bankruptcy Since
2008
YorN
N

N

2016-2o17
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The authors next sought to create a comprehensive picture of each of the
sample cities' financial statuses before, during, and-if applicable-after financial
distress. To do so, the authors examined bond issuance reports and supplemented
these reports with other publicly available information, such as published studies
and news articles, from the relevant period of time. The authors also undertook a
comprehensive review of the laws applicable to each municipality to identify laws
that could impact a municipality's fiscal stability.
To better organize their research, the authors centered their analysis on eight
factors that they predicted would shape both municipal fiscal distress and the
municipality's ability to respond to it. These factors are commonly discussed in the
literature on municipal fiscal health;32 the relative importance of these factors,
however-and the extent to which these factors interact to impact municipal fiscal
health in particular cases-has not been comprehensively documented. The authors
coded each factor's prevalence within each municipality by developing a three-point
scale of high, moderate, and low. "High" represented a high impact on municipal
fiscal distress, "moderate" a moderate impact, and "low" a low impact.
The following provides a brief description of the eight factors chosen and the
reasoning behind the authors' choices.
i. Fiscal Home Rule
Home rule refers to a municipality's ability to pass laws to govern itself without
seeking state authorization.13 Fiscal home rule is home rule authority over monetary
affairs.3 4 Whether a municipality has been granted home rule powers naturally
affects the amount of discretion the entity has to structure itself." Many states
provide some form of home rule to their municipal entities. 36 Yet, the degree of
home rule powers varies considerably across jurisdictions: some municipalities have
the ability to legislate in almost any area without fear of state intervention, while
others are subject to rigorous state oversight and approval, even though they retain
some freedom to act autonomously in discrete matters." The degree to which a
particular municipal entity is granted fiscal home rule authority does not bear on
whether that entity is authorized to file for bankruptcy." Nevertheless, the authors
predicted that those municipalities experiencing a greater degree of fiscal home rule
authority would have more options at their disposal for dealing with fiscal distress

&

32 &ee, e.g., Park, supra note 9, at 234-37 (discussing municipal bankruptcy access); Gillette
Skeel, supra note 8, at 1222-23, 1226-27 (discussing financial mismanagement and home rule).
3 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1226-27.
See Clayton P. Gillette, FiscalHome Rule, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 1241, 1245 (2009) (discussing
the scope of fiscal home rule).
31 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 8 at 1226-27.
3 Lyle Kossis, Note, Examining the Confict Between Municipal Receivership and Local
Autonomy, 98 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1114 (2012).
37 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1226.
* The State Role in Local Government FinancialDistress, supra note 23, at 6-7.
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on their own. Thus, these municipalities may not need to turn to federal or even
state solutions for fiscal relief.
To ascertain whether a state provided home rule authority, the authors searched
through state statutes and constitutional provisions. To determine practical

limitations on home rule authority, the authors examined publicly available reports
from sources such as municipal leagues and state websites. When fiscal home rule
or the ability to raise taxes independently of state approval was available to the
municipality, the authors coded this factor as having a low impact on fiscal
distress." When minimal restraints on fiscal home rule authority were present, such
as constitutional constraints on home rule powers, borrowing constraints, balanced
budget requirements, or significant tax caps, the authors coded the impact as
moderate. Where extensive restraints, such as no local taxing authority or explicit
fiscal carve-outs in home rule grants were present, or where no fiscal home rule
authority was available, the authors coded the impact as high.
Table 2: Fiscal Home Rule4
City

39

State

Fiscal Home Rule?

Glendale

Arizona

Yes

Irvine

California

Yes

San Bernardino

California

Yes

Stockton

California

Yes

Vallejo

California

Yes

New Britain

Connecticut

No

West Haven

Connecticut

No

Chicago

Illinois

Yes

Hammond

Indiana

No

New Orleans

Louisiana

Yes, but some restrictions

Baltimore

Maryland

Yes

Detroit

Michigan

Yes, but some restrictions

North Las Vegas

Nevada

No

Bayonne

New Jersey

Yes, but some restrictions

Jersey City

New Jersey

Yes, but some restrictions

All coding results appear in Table X, infra.
* Detailed research for each of the cities' fiscal home rule status is on file with the authors;
significant fiscal home rule information is also described in the case studies in Part II and in the
Appendix, infra.

Predictors of Municipal Bankruptcies and State Intervention

2016-20r7

Niagara Falls
Utica
Scranton

New York
New York
Pennsylvania

Providence

Rhode

505

No
No
Yes
No
I___________

_____________Island

ii. Intergovernmental Aid
The extent of aid that cities receive from states necessarily affects such
municipalities' ability to offer services to residents. Increasingly, cities are
experiencing cuts to intergovernmental aid and must look to other revenue sources
to make up the difference. 4 ' The authors predicted that cities receiving relatively
low amounts of intergovernmental aid would, in the absence of alternative revenuegenerating options, struggle to fill budget shortfalls in the wake of a fiscal crisis.42
Where possible, the authors determined parameters for the provision of state
aid through state law research. The authors also obtained information on state aid
expressed as a proportion of total general state revenues from a 2015 report on
fiscal structure compiled by the National League of Cities.43 When possible, the
authors confirmed this data via publicly accessible reports.' Intergovernmental aid
for the states in the authors' sample ranged from a low of 8% to a high of 39%.
When intergovernmental aid as a proportion of state general revenue was equal to
or greater than 30%, the authors coded this factor as low impact, between 20-29%,
moderate; and below 20%, high.
Table 3: Intergovernmental Aid45
City

State

Intergovernmental Aid

41 Erin Adele Scharif, Powerful Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and What to do
About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 341 (2016); see also Frank Shafroth, Any Hope for a
Municipalty's -,sad Future?, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (June 9, 2016),
https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2016/06/09/any-hope-for-a-municipalitys-fiscal-future/
[https//perma.cc/VGB5-29AB I (describing the negative impact on East Cleveland when Ohio took
away revenue streams, including shared revenue from taxes).
42 See Christopher Hoene & Michael A. Pagano, Cities & State IMscal Structure, NATL LEAGUE
(2008),
11-12
CITIEs,
bttp://www.nlc.org/documents/Find%20City%20Solutions/Research%20lnnovation/Finance/citiesstate-fiscal-structure-2008-rpt.pdf [https-//perma.cc/RG9K-DGR7] ("[G]enerally, well-structured state
aid increases the overall capacity of municipal governments and in many instances provides a level of
equalization and base support for municipalities that may lack other resources.").
43 Cities & State Fiscal Structure 2015, NAT'L LEAGUE CITIES, http-//www.nlc.org/find-citysolutions/city-solutions-and-applied-research/finance/cities-and-state-fiscal-structure
[https*//perma.cc/9T4L-4WWM] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
44 Detailed research results are on file with the authors. Specific information on intergovernmental
aid is described in Part II and in the Appendix, infra.
45 As a percentage of state general revenue. See Cities & State FiscalStructure2015, supra note 43.
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Glendale

Arizona

21%

Irvine

California

8%

San Bernardino

California

8%

Stockton

California

8%

Vallejo

California

8%

New Britain

Connecticut

39%

West Haven

Connecticut

39%

Chicago

Illinois

24%

Hammond

Indiana

19%

New Orleans

Louisiana

13%

Baltimore

Maryland

32%

Detroit

Michigan

16%

North Las Vegas

Nevada

26%

Bayonne

NewJersey

24%

Jersey City

New Jersey

24%

Niagara Falls

New York

30%

Utica

New York

30%

Scranton

Pennsylvania

22%

Providence

Rhode Island

29%
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iii. Tax and Expenditure Limits
State tax and expenditure limits, commonly known as TELs, tie restrictions on
government revenues or spending to either a fixed numerical target or to increases
in an index such as population or inflation." Additionally, states may require voter
approval or a legislative supermajority before a municipality can pass new taxes. 47 In
some cases, states can impose their own TELs. 48 As of 2015, "41 states impose
some form of a TEL on their municipalities." 49
TELs can constrain state expenditures, particularly when combined with a
supermajority requirement to raise taxes.so Although empirical evidence on the
Briefing Book:

The State of State (and Local) Tax Pobcy, TAX POLY CTR.,

http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-tax-and-expenditure-limits

[https://perma.cc/JU5M-JGHM] (last visited Jan. 23, 2017).
47

Id.
4 Id.
* Cities & State Iscal Structure2015, supra note 43.
* See Brian G. Knight, Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the

States, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 41, 61-62 (2000).
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extent to which TELs limit state and local spending has been mixed,s" the authors
predicted that municipalities subject to TELs would have a greater need for federal
and state assistance with fiscal crises, particularly when TELs are coupled with
other restraints, such as limited intergovernmental aid and minimal home rule
authority. TELs restrain fiscal federalism by interfering with the choices available
to localities. 52 Logically, then, states with more binding TELs will have
municipalities more reliant upon state aid.
To ascertain the existence of TELs, the authors examined state statutes and
constitutional provisions and confirmed the existence of limitations by examining
state Department of Revenue websites." The authors also utilized data on TELs
from the National League of Cities report.5 4 Following the authors' practice in the
report, they distinguished between binding TELs and TELs that could potentially
be circumvented by other measures,ss which they labeled "semi-binding TELs."
Whether a TEL is binding or not is important because the more binding a TEL is,
the more it limits the fiscal autonomy of the municipalities it impacts. When a
state had no TELs or non-binding TELs, the authors coded the impact as low;
states with semi-binding TELS were coded as moderate; and states with binding
TELs were coded as high.
Table 4: Tax and Expenditure Limits5 6
City

State

Tax & Expenditure Limits

Glendale

Arizona

Binding property
expenditure limit

tax

limit;

general

Irvine

Califomnia

tax

limit-,

general

San Bernardino

California

tax

limit;

general

Stockton

California

Binding property
expenditure limit
Binding property
expenditure limit
Binding property
expenditure limit
Binding property
expenditure limit

tax

limit;

general

tax

limit;

general

California

s See, e.g., Tracy M. Gordon, The Calculus of Constraint: A CriticalReview of State Fiscal
Institutions, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY

271,277-78 (Elizabeth Garrett, Elizabeth A. Graddy, & Howell E. Jackson eds., 2008).
52 Leah Brooks & Justin H. Phillips, An InstitutionalExplanation for the Stickiness of Federal
Grants, 26 J.L. ECON. &ORG. 243, 246 (2010).
" Detailed research results are on file with the authors. Specific information on TELs is described
in Part II and in the Appendix, infra.
' Hoene & Pagano, supranote 42, at 13-14.
5 See, e.g., id. at 13-15 (providing the examples of a lone rate limit that might be circumvented by
raising assessments, and a lone assessment limit that might be circumvented by raising property tax
rates).
' See Cities & State Fiscal Structure2015, supra note 43.
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New Britain

Connecticut

No TELs

West Haven

Connecticut

No TELs

Chicago

Illinois

Hammond

Indiana

New Orleans

Louisiana

Semi binding property tax limit; no
expenditure limit
Semi binding property tax limit; no
expenditure limit
Semi binding property tax limit, no

Baltimore

Maryland

Semi binding property tax limit; no

Detroit

Michigan

North Las Vegas

Nevada

Bayonne

New jersey

Jersey City

New Jersey

Semi binding property
expenditure limit
Binding property tax
expenditure limit
Binding property tax
expenditure limit
Binding property tax
expenditure limit

Niagara Falls

New York

Utica

New York

Scranton

Pennsylvania

Providence

Rhode Island

expenditure limit
expenditure limit"

tax limit, no
limit;

general

limit;

general

limit;

general

Semi binding property tax limit, no
expenditure limit
Semi binding property tax limit; no
expenditure limit

Semi binding property tax limit; no
expenditure limit
Semi binding property tax limit; no
expenditure limit

iv. Access to Municipal Bankruptcy
As previously discussed, local governments may only file for Chapter 9
municipal bankruptcy relief if the state in which they are located explicitly
authorizes them to do so. Although about half of the states have specific
authorization for Chapter 9 filings, many condition access to Chapter 9 on a
municipality meeting particular qualifying criteria.s" Other states have no laws
governing Chapter 9 filings; this silence in the law is deemed to prohibit

s Baltimore's property tax limit can be circumvented at the municipality's discretion and is
effectively non-binding. For this reason, the authors have designated this factor as "low risk" for
Baltimore in Table X, infra.
ss See eg., A.B. 506, 2011-12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2011) (conditioning access to chapter 9 on
participation in a neutral evaluation process).
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bankruptcy access.s" Accordingly, the authors predicted that municipalities located
in states with restrictive or no authorization for Chapter 9 would be more likely to
utilize a state receivership program or, to the extent possible, enact reforms locally
instead of taking advantage of the federal bankruptcy system when available to
them.
The authors located state laws that grant municipalities access to Chapter 9
bankruptcy. In addition to scrutinizing state laws explicitly relating to municipal
bankruptcy, the authors examined other laws with regard to state financial policies
and practices to obtain a fuller picture of a municipality's likelihood of accessing
bankruptcy in any given state. The authors then scaled the states according to the
ease with which their municipalities may access bankruptcy, When states had no
preconditions to accessing municipal bankruptcy, the authors coded this factor as
low impact; when states had preconditioned authorization, moderate; and when
states had no authorization, high.
Table 5: Access to Municipal Bankruptcy'
City

State

Access to Municipal Bankruptcy

Glendale

Arizona

Express authorization; no preconditions

Irvine

California

Authorization with preconditions

San Bernardino

California

Authorization with preconditions

Stockton

California

Authorization with preconditions

Vallejo

California

Authorization with preconditions

New Britain

Connecticut

Authorization with preconditions

West Haven
Chicago
Hammond

Connecticut
Illinois
Indiana

Authorization with preconditions
No authorization/silent
No authorization/silent

New Orleans

Louisiana

Authorization with preconditions

Baltimore

Maryland

No authorization/silent

Detroit

Michigan

Authorization with preconditions

North Las Vegas

Nevada

No authorization/silent

Bayonne

New Jersey

Authorization with preconditions

Jersey City

New Jersey

Authorization with preconditions

* See Municipal Bankruptcy State Laws, GOVERNING, http://www.governing.comL/gov-data/statemunicipal-bankruptcy-laws-policies-map.html

[https://perma.cc/LSZ4-FFD4]

(last visited Jan. 24,

2017).
6 Detailed research results are on file with the authors. Specific information on access to municipal
bankruptcy is described in Part II and in the Appendix, infa.
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Niagara Falls

New York

Authorization with preconditions

Utica

New York

Authorization with preconditions

Scranton

Pennsylvania

Authorization with preconditions

Providence

Rhode Island

No authorization'

Vol. 105

v. Unfunded Pension Liability
Nationwide unfunded liabilities for pensions and retiree health care range
anywhere from $1.4 to over $4 trillion, depending on the assumptions used in the
calculation.62 Scholars have been able to link large unfunded pension liabilities and
unfunded retiree health benefits to the likelihood that a municipality will become
insolvent. 3

The authors developed a measure accounting for the unfunded pension liability
ratio of each of the nineteen cities using data presented in the Pew Charitable
Trusts' report The State Pensions Funding Gap." The most recent year for which
data is available is 2013. The percentages found in Table VI provide the ratio of
public sector pension liability in each state that was funded in 2013. States with
lower funded ratios have greater amounts of unfunded pension liability and present
a greater risk of financial instability. Because funding at or above 80% is considered
the mark of a "healthy" fund,65 the authors coded states with a pension funded
liability ratio of 80% and above as low impact, those with ratios between 70% and
79% as moderate; and those with ratios below 70% as high.
65 Although Rhode Island technically authorizes chapter 9 filing upon the municipality meeting
certain conditions and approvals, the state's financial policies effectively prohibit the practice such that
municipal bankruptcy is unauthorized in effect, if not in the law. For a filler discussion, see Frost, supra
note 19, at 837 n.93.
62 See Robert Novy-Marx &Joshua Rauh, PublcPension Promises: How BftAre They and What
Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1211-13, 1231 (2011); Cory Eucalitto, State Budget Solutions'
Third Annual State Debt Report Shows Total State Debt Over $4 Tn2ion, AM. LEGIS. tXCH.
COUNCIL (Aug. 28, 2012), https://www.alec.org/article/state-budget-solutions-third-annual-statedebt-report-shows-total-state-debt-over-4-trillion/ [https://perma.cc/3CS6-NGVV]; The Widening
Gap
Update,
PEW
CHARITABLE
TR.
1
(June
2012),
http-//www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs-assets/2012/pewpensionsupdatepdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2QV-X6VZ]; US. States' Debt Tops $4 Trillion-Report, REUTERS (Aug. 28,
2012,
12:09
PM),
http-//www.reuters.com/article/usa-states-debt-idUSL2E8JS6ZT20120828
[https://perma.cc/WBW7-LZ6V].
6 See THOM REILLY, RETHINKING PUBLIC SECTOR COMPENSATION: WHAT EVER
HAPPENED TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST? 112-16 (2012); Wayne H. Winegarden, Going Broke One
City at a Time: Municipal Bankruptcies in America, PAC. RES. INST., 4, 6 (Jan. 2014),
https://www.pacifcresearch.org/fileadmin/documents/Studies/PDFs/20132015/MunicipalBankruptcy20l4_F.pdf [https-//perma.cc/M7VF-PTG9].
(' See generally The State PensionsFunding Gap: ChallengesPersist, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (July
14, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/07/the-state-pensionsfunding-gap-challenges-persist [https://perma.cc/2D3C-QPXE].
6s
Public
Pensions,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Publicpensions
[https.//perma.cc/9FQ-PQBB] (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
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Table 6: Unfunded Pension Liability"
Pension Liability Funded ratio

Chicago

State
State_(2013)
Illinois

39%

New Britain

Connecticut

48%

West Haven

Connecticut

48%

New Orleans

Louisiana

58%

Providence

Rhode Island

58%

Detroit

Michigan

60%

Scranton

Pennsylvania

62%

Bayonne

New Jersey

63%

Jersey City
Hammond

New Jersey
Indiana

63%

Baltimore

Maryland

65%

North Las Vegas

Nevada

69%

Glendale

Arizona

72%

Irvine

California

72%

San Bernardino

California

72%

Stockton

California

72%

Vallejo

California

72%

Niagara Falls

New York

89%

Utica

New York

89%

City
City

65%

vi. Public Sector Union Density
A broad collection of studies links unionism and collective bargaining with
higher costs of government.1 7 Several scholars suggest that the political power of
public sector unions has a greater impact on fringe benefits than on wages, and
collectively bargained environments have been associated with enhanced pension

6 Detailed research results are on file with the authors. Specific information on unfunded pension
liability is described in Part H and in the Appendix, infr.
6' See Sarah F. Anzia & Terry M. Moe, Publc Sector Unionsand the Costs of Governrment, 77 J.
POL. 114, 115, 124-25 (2015); Robert G. Valletta, The Impact of Uaionism on Municipal
Expenditures and Revenues, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 430, 435, 438-39 (1989) (finding that
collective bargaining increases government spending in departments covered by contract).
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coverage for employees." As such, the authors surmised that municipal
governments with a higher density of public sector union membership would have
more challenges with unsustainable wages and benefits as well as the ability to
renegotiate collective bargaining agreements.
The authors explored this factor by researching the percentage of unionized
government employees in local areas. The authors obtained data from the most
recent Current Population Survey produced by the U.S. Census Bureau and the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The authors also obtained data from 2014 from
UnionStats.com; this data was organized according to Metropolitan Statistical
Area ("MSA"). 6 ' After narrowing the 2014 data to include only the relevant MSAs
for the author's nineteen selected cities, the authors sorted and ranked the data
from greatest to least by the percentage of government workers in unions to
produce an index of public sector union density for each MSA that includes the
nineteen cities in the author's sample."o The authors then calculated the percentage
for each area by taking the total number of public sector union members in each
MSA and dividing by the total amount of public sector workers in the same MSA.
When union membership among public sector workers was less than 30%, the
authors coded this factor as low impact, between 31% and 50% as moderate; and
above 50% as high.
Table 6: Public Sector Union Density (Metropolitan Statistical Area)71
Density
Rank

State

City

Union Membership
Among Public Sector
Workers

1"_

North Las Vegas

Nevada

78.62%

2
3
4
5*
6*
7
8

Niagara Falls
Utica
Stockton
Bayonne
Jersey City
Providence
West Haven

New York
New York
California
New Jersey
NewJersey
Rhode Island
Connecticut

76.73%
73.12%
72.83%
67.86%
67.86%
64.11%
62.74%

6 See Richard B. Freeman, Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds, in PENSIONS, LABOR,
AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE, 89, 90-104 (David A. Wise ed., 1985); Eileen Norcross, Publc Sector
Unionism: A Review 13, 16-17 (Mercatus Ctr. Geo. Mason Univ., Working Paper No. 11-26, 2011),
http://mercatis.org/sites/default/files/WPll26-Public-Sector-Unionism.pdf [https-//perma.cc/TW6EXZCC].
69
Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage DatabaseFrom the
CPS, UNIONSTATS.COM, httpJ//unionstats.com/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
'0 Data for union membership in North Las Vegas was provided separately. Personal
communication from Ryann Juden, Assistant City Manager, North Las Vegas (on file with authors).
71 Detailed research results are on file with the authors. Specific information on public sector union
density is described in Part II and in the Appendix, infda.
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Vallejo

California

10

New Britain

Connecticut

513

58.49%
56.56%

56.34%
Illinois
Chicago
11*
56.34%
Indiana
Hammond
12*
55.80%
California
Irvine
13
55.00%
Michigan
Detroit
14
54.790/o
Pennsylvania
Scranton
15
54.61%
California
San Bernardino
16
34.01%
Maryland
Baltimore
17
19.75%
Arizona
Glendale
18
9.40%
Louisiana
New Orleans
19
* SharedMetropolitan StatisticalArea
"Data for union membership in North Las Vegas was proi4ded by Ryann
Juden, Assistant City Manager, North Las Vegas (detaileddata on fle with the
authors).
vii. Financial Mismanagement
Financial mismanagement is linked to municipal fiscal insolvency and is often
exposed when the town, municipality, or special district issues too much debt.72
Fiscal instability may come to light after years of financial mismanagement and
economic decline. The authors therefore studied documentation of poor financial
management of a municipality's fiscal resources as a contributing factor to
municipal distress.
To study financial mismanagement, the authors reviewed bond reports issued
by Fitch, KBRA, Moody's and S&P for any relevant documentation. The authors
also sought information from journal articles, government reports, and newspaper
articles. When the authors found no documentation, the authors coded this factor
as low impact; when the authors found some evidence, such as budgeting practices
that consistently fell short of targeted goals or a tendency to look to short-term
remedies, the authors coded this factor as moderate impact; and when there was an
indication that financial mismanagement was a major contributor to distress, as
when mismanagement resulted in purchases or practices that saddled the city with
debt for years to come, the authors coded this factor as high impact.

72

Winegarden, supra note 63.
See general- infra Part II and Appendix for a fuller discussion of financial mismanagement in
specific cities.
'3
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Table 8: Financial Mismanagement"4
City

State

Financial Mismanagement

Glendale

Arizona

Major factor

Irvine

California

Major factor

San Bernardino

California

Major factor

Stockton

California

Major factor

Vallejo

California

Some evidence

New Britain

Connecticut

No documentation

West Haven

Connecticut

No documentation

Chicago

Illinois

Major factor

Hammond

Indiana

No documentation

New Orleans

Louisiana

Major factor

Baltimore

Maryland

No documentation

Detroit

Michigan

Major factor

North Las Vegas

Nevada

Major factor

Bayonne

New Jersey

No documentation

Jersey City
Niagara Falls

New Jersey
New York

Major factor

Utica

New York

Major factor

Scranton

Pennsylvania

Some evidence

Providence

Rhode Island

Major factor

No documentation

viii. Triggering Event
A significant triggering event can lead directly to fiscal distress. One wellpublicized example is the decision by public officials in Orange County, California
to engage in a highly leveraged strategy of derivatives-based speculation." When
interest rates rose, these investments turned into "losers" for the county,
precipitating a loss of $1.5 billion in the county's portfolio and leading to the
7 Detailed research results are on file with the authors. Specific information on financial
mismanagement is described in Part II and in the Appendix, infa.
's Floyd Norris, Orange County's Bankruptcy. The Overiew, Orange County Crisisjolts Bond
Market,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1994 at D17, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/08/business/orange-countys-bankruptcy-the-overview-orange-county-crisis-jolts-bond-market.html
[https://perma.cc/N5M3BAQ9].
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county's decision to file for bankruptcy.16 As another example, Boise County,
Idaho's 2011 bankruptcy filing was primarily caused by the county's inability to pay
a multimillion dollar judgment to a developer.7 The authors therefore studied
documentation of internal and external triggering events that contributed to
municipal distress.
Similar to the approach used with respect to financial mismanagement, the
authors reviewed bond issuance reports, journal articles, government reports, and
newspaper articles to determine whether an internal or external triggering event
contributed to a municipality's fiscal distress. If the authors found no triggering
event, the authors coded the factor as low impact; if the authors found that an
event was a contributing factor, such as a court decision that impacted the
municipality's fiscal health, the authors coded the factor as moderate impact; and if
the authors found a major triggering event that directly contributed to municipal
insolvency and financial instability, such as the natural disasters that occurred in
New Orleans, the authors coded the factor as high impact.
Table 9: Triggering Event"
City

State

Triggering Event

Glendale

Arizona

Major event- Stadiums

Irvine

California

Major event- Park

San Bernardino

California

No triggering event

Stockton

California

Major event- Ill-timed bond offering

Vallejo

California

No triggering event

New Britain

Connecticut

No triggering event

West Haven

Connecticut

Chicago

Illinois

No triggering event
Contributing factor - pension ruling
from II. Sup. Ct.

Hammond

Indiana

New Orleans

Louisiana

No triggering event
Major event- Hurricane / Gulf Oil
Spill

Baltimore

Maryland

No triggering event

76I.

n Marc Fudge, The Varied and Diverse Pre&ctorsofLocal Government Bankruptcy, PA TIMES,
[https://perma.cc/3DAGhttp://patimes.org/varied-diverse-predictors-local-government-bankruptcy/
X79Z] (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
" See generally infra Part II and Appendix for a filer discussion of triggering events that occurred
in specific cities.
7 Detailed research results are on file with the authors. Specific information on triggering events is
described in Part II and in the Appendix, ina.
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Detroit

Michigan

North Las Vegas

Nevada

Contributing factor- Auto industry
Major event- City Hal / Water
treatment facility

Bayonne

New Jersey

No triggering event

Jersey City
Niagara Falls

New Jersey
New York

No triggering event
No triggering event

Utica

New York

No triggering event

Scranton

Pennsylvania

Contributing factor

Providence

Rhode Island

No triggering event

ix. Other Factors
Other factors, including other municipal revenue sources, political preferences
within local government, and employer or industry concentration within a
municipality, are possible contributors to municipal fiscal distress. Although the
authors acknowledged these factors where documentation was available, they chose
to focus on the above eight factors as those that both the scholarly literature and
industry reports point to as being the most significant for the greatest number of
municipalities in their sample.
After identifying the eight factors and analyzing their impact on the fiscal
health of the municipalities in their sample, the authors compiled a detailed case
study for each municipality. These case studies demonstrate the various ways in
which the factors identified interact to produce different effects in individual
municipalities. As discussed more fully below, certain combinations of factors, such
as high pension burdens, a large union presence, and fiscal mismanagement, tended
to produce high levels of fiscal distress. Yet, the case studies also demonstrate how
such distress is either mitigated or exacerbated by the presence of other factors,
such as home rule authority and intergovernmental aid.
II. CASE STUDIES: STATES AND CITIES

State involvement in municipal fiscal affairs entails much more than the dollar
amount states allocate to their local governments. This Part examines the states in
which the authors' sample cities are located in an effort to capture the key
components of the state's relationship with its localities. In addition, this Part
paints a detailed picture of some of the sample cities to identify combinations of
factors that led to municipal distress.
Studying the relationship between each state and city in the authors' sample
helps uncover the key reasons behind the path a city will ultimately choose in order
to manage its fiscal stress. Scholars have acknowledged that a municipality's ability
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to deal with problems is strongly connected with its relationship to its state.
Sometimes, a city will be forced to choose a particular path because all other paths
are dosed to it; other times, the city may have a range of options at its disposal but
will be guided to a particular path because of its legal, political, and historical
relationship with the state. Clearly, state policies and laws have a substantial impact
on a city's financial position and on its ability to access various fiscal relief
mechanisms.
The following case studies provide examples of cities embarking on a multitude
of different pathways into and out of fiscal distress. The case studies featured in
this Article represent a spectrum of cities that receive varying amounts of
intergovernmental assistance. Because of the importance of a city's relationship
with its state, the authors present these case studies in order of relative state
assistance or involvement in municipal fiscal affairs, with those states being the
most involved presented first. Case studies for the following cities are presented
below to provide the most vivid illustration of the variance in state-city
relationships: Detroit, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; Scranton, Pennsylvania;
Bayonne, New Jersey, West Haven, Connecticut-, Glendale, Arizona; and Irvine,
Stockton, San Bernardino, and Vallejo, California. Additional case studies for the
remainder of the states and cities in the authors' sample can be found in the
Appendix: New Britain, Connecticut; Hammond, Indiana; New Orleans,
Louisiana; Baltimore, Maryland; North Las Vegas, Nevada; Jersey City, New
Jersey, Niagara Falls and Utica, New York; and Providence, Rhode Island.
A. Michigan
Michigan has extensive intervention and aid mechanisms for its municipalities,
to the point that several cities-notably, Detroit-have begun to push back on the
state's interference. Indeed, in the period leading up to Detroit's bankruptcy, city
leaders actively "resist[ed] state intervention, fearing it could lead to long-term state
control" of the city." Michigan's extensive assistance program for municipalities
allows for the appointment of an emergency manager who can take over city
operations, restructure finances, request emergency relief, provide technical
assistance, and even dis-incorporate or dissolve a city entirely.' Emergency
managers have played a significant role in Michigan's history, being sent to seven
cities in the state from 1990 to 2010.'
Michigan has also recently begun taking more proactive measures to monitor
and evaluate its municipalities' fiscal health. State officials now must create a
'stress" score for each municipality based on nine categories, which are then are

0 See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG &DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: How STATES STIFLE URBAN
INNOVATION 4 (2008).
The State Role in Local GovernmentFflnancialDistress, supra note 23, at 3.
SId. at 16-17.
Id. at 42.
8
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posted on the Treasury Department's website." State officials can then intervene if
the score indicates that a municipality may become insolvent. The exact manner of
intervention is determined by the municipalities themselves, which can choose
among four options, including the appointment of an emergency manager.ss
Despite Michigan's extensive options and mechanisms for intervention, some
critics have noted that Michigan's response to local distress very often amounts to
tightening fiscal controls without offering additional aid for the labor and service
obligations the state continues to impose on its municipalities.'
Michigan's constitution contains explicit protections for public pensions.
Article IX, Section 24 provides that the "accrued financial benefits of each pension
plan ... shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or
impaired."'
Home rule authority in Michigan is also provided for by the state constitution,
which prohibits Michigan from imposing unfunded mandates on local
governments." Most Michigan cities derive a significant portion of their revenue
from property taxes, although the property tax rate for cities is capped.' Cities may
also levy an income tax of up to 1%.90 At the state level, Michigan shares a
percentage of its sales tax revenue with local governments, distributing the revenue
based on population." Cities may also incur general obligation debt up to a limit of
10%." All Michigan local governments must further adopt an annual balanced
budget.'

Id. at 9.
* Experts Examine Current Chapter 9 Cases and What Lies Ahead for Municipal Distress in
2013, AM. BANKR. INST., 12:00-13:05 (Jan. 22, 2013), http-//www.abi.org/educational-brief/expertsexamire-current-chapter-9-cases-and-what-lies-ahead-for-municipal-distress
[https://perma.cc/E5S4P

rlU].

*6 Joshua Sapotichne et al., Beyond State Takeovers: Reconsideringthe Role ofState Government
in Local FinancialDistress, with ImportantLessons for Aichiganand Its Embattled Cities, MICH. ST.
U.
EXTENSION
3
(Aug.
31,
2015),
http://msue.anr.msu.edu/uploads/resources/pdfs/beyond-state-takeovers.pdf [https*//perma.cc/7BM54FCR].
* MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
" Samuel B. Stone, Home Rule in the Midwest, IND. U. PUB. POL'Y INST. 3 (Jul. 2010),
http://policyinstitute.iu.edu/uploads/PublicationFiles/PCHmRulesWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS8KE5BH].
*9 Id
90 Id.
91Id
92

93

Id
Id.
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i. Detroit, Population: 677,116;94 Annual Budget: $1 billion9 5
Detroit, Michigan's largest municipality, filed for bankruptcy on July 18, 2013
to restructure approximately $18 billion in outstanding debt.9 6 Of this, "$3.5 billion
[was] comprised of pensions while another $6.4 billion encompasse[d] other
employee benefits like retiree healthcare."" In the years before the bankruptcy,
Detroit lost one million residents and three fourths of its retail business." The
city's poverty stands in stark contrast to the wealth of its surrounding suburbs, so
one considered solution was to dissolve the boundaries between Detroit and its
99
suburbs, forcing the suburbs to help address Detroit's financial condition.
Although pension debt, and the ability of a bankruptcy court to reduce it, was a
focal point in Detroit's bankruptcy, the bankruptcy as a whole was caused by
numerous other. factors, including poor development decisions, suburban flight,
employment loss, risky financial ventures, and Detroit officials' generally
irresponsible fiscal behavior.1" In its bankruptcy plan, Detroit cut pensions by
approximately 18%.o1 One report described the city as the "poster-child" for poor
fiscal management practices, noting that city officials repeatedly "kicked the can
02
down the road" rather than addressing problems as they arose. Other studies
blame union influence for making the Detroit auto industry less competitive and

9

Detroit

City,

Alichigan,

U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU,

(last
[https://perma.cc/2KXJ-29GS]
http-//www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/2622000
visited Jan. 24, 2017).
5 Joe Guillen, Benefits for Council Stafflncludedin DetroitBudget, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Mar.
11, 2016 7:28 PM), http-//www.freep.com/story/news/2016/03/11/detroit-city-council-approves-1billion-budget/81638852/ [https://perma.ce/THU9-TMWR]. When possible, annual budget numbers
are given for the current fiscal year, otherwise, they are given for the most recent year for which data is
publicly available. Budget information is designed to provide the reader with a general context for how
badly distressed the city is.
9 Chris Isidore, Detroit Fes for Bankmptcy, CNN MONEY (Jul. 18, 2013, 7:25 PM),
[https-//perma.cc/4C98http-//money.cnn.com/2013/07/18/news/economy/detroit-bankruptcy/
LN4X].
9 Frost, supra note 19, at 819.
" Todd Shields, Comcast to Follow 1 AMilion Who'vc Fled Bankrupt Detroit, BLOOMBERG
TECH. (Oct. 1, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-10-01/comcast-tofollow-l-million-who-ve-fled-bankrupt-detroit [httpsi//perma.cc/2JN3-QAPD].
9 See generalyChristopher J. Tyson, MunicipalIdentity as Property, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 647
(2014) (discussing municipal boundaries in the context of Detroit's bankruptcy and financial woes).
is0 See Vaneeta Chintamaneni, The Unraveling of an American City- Pensions, Municipal Debt,
and Chapter9 Bankruptcy, 22 ELDER L.J. 523,532-34 (2015).
1or Frank Shafroth, Protecting the Abilty to Provide Essental Publc Services, GMU MUN.
1,
2015),
PROJECT
(Jul.
SUSTAINABILITY
https*//fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/07/01/protecting-the-ability-to-provide-essential-publicservices/ [https*//perma.cc/SM59-567F] [hereinafter Shafroth, Protecting the Abilty to Provide
EssentialPublc Services].
102 Fudge, supra note 77.
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for driving up costs for retirees, many of which Detroit was ultimately unable to
pay.1 0 3

Post-bankruptcy, Detroit's governance structure remains fragmented and
redundant, impairing the city's ability to adjust to challenges.'" Examples of this
fragmentation include separate planning departments, which report separately to
the mayor's office and the city council; separate auditors for the mayor's office and
the city council; and separate attorneys for different facets of city government.'os
Even the feasibility expert in Detroit's bankruptcy, who ultimately concluded that
the bankruptcy plan was feasible, expressed significant concern that the bankruptcy
did not include governance reforms.' o
Another lingering challenge for Detroit is how to address its failing public
school system. Although the system is a separate entity from the city, the two are
"integrally related," such that the school district's distress affects the city's financial
health, and vice versa.'
Several philanthropic foundations stepped in to assist with Detroit's bankruptcy
emergence, including the Kresge Foundation and the Ford Foundation."0 s
Michigan's cooperation was also essential to Detroit's ability to exit bankruptcy.
Michigan assisted with Detroit's first post-bankruptcy bond issuance and, during
the bankruptcy itself, Michigan agreed to provide some funding.1o9
Thus, some intervention on the state's behalf was necessary in Detroit's
bankruptcy-, but bankruptcy also left many critical problems in Detroit untouched,
particularly mismanagement and poor governance by local officials. Detroit thus
provides a vivid example of the limitations of municipal bankruptcy. Chapter 9
does not provide governance reform, nor can it fix the problems of unrelated
entities, such as a municipality's school districts. Given the limitations of Chapter 9
relief, perhaps it is not surprising that Chicago, which faces governance and school
district problems of its own, has not sought to file for bankruptcy. Yet, Detroit also
illustrates some of the ways municipal bankruptcy can be effective, too. The city is

o John Hawkins, 5 Ways Liberalism Destroyed Detroit, TOWNHALL.COM (Jul. 30, 2013 12:01
AM), http://townhall.com/columnists/johnhawkins/2013/07/30/5-ways-liberalism-destroyed-detroitn1651524 [https://perma.cc/86YC-XHTX].
104 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1187.
15 Id. at 1187-88.
'0 Id. at 1198.
10o Frank Shafroth, Twin Miracles?, GMULJ MuN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (May 3, 2016),
https-//fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2016/05/03/twin-mirades/
[https://perma.cc/R44C-E4P2]
(noting that the quality of the school system is essential to attracting families and employees to the city).
' Cristy Lytal & Nicholas Williams, CPPP Teams Up with Kresge Foundation to 'Drawon
Detroit' USC PRICE (Mar. 23, 2016), https://priceschool.usc.edu/cppp-teams-up-with-kresgefoundation-to-draw-on-detroit/ [https-//perma.cc/6QS7-9NNM] (describing the role the philanthropic
sector played in Detroit).
1" Frank Shafroth, Can Default Be Contagious?, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY PROJECT (Aug.
7,
2015),
https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2015/08/10/can-default-be-contagious/
[https*//perma.cc/S6GW-G82F].
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now on firmer financial footing and has a plan for fimancing its pensions and other
commitments that city officials, so far, have been able and willing to commit to."o
B. Illinois
Illinois has a comprehensive state intervention program and has sometimes
actively rescued troubled municipalities by increasing state aid in times of fiscal
distress. For example, in 1990, the state legislature provided a loan package for the
city of East St. Louis and also installed an advisory board and financial manager for
the city."' Illinois law allows the state to designate a local government as being in a
state of fiscal distress or emergency once a municipality petitions the governor to
establish an advisory commission."' The governor has sixty days from the date of
the petition to determine whether in fact an emergency exists and, if so, whether to
establish the commission." 3 During this time, the government must provide notice
and an opportunity to be heard to all of the municipality's creditors."' If the
governor forms a commission, he may give it oversight powers and the ability to
recommend that the municipality file for bankruptcy." 5 The commission may also
review the municipality's financial decisions and order the municipality to negotiate
with creditors."'
The Illinois Constitution contains explicit protections for public pensions.
Article XlIII, Section 5 provides that membership in any public pension or
retirement system is "an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which
shall not be diminished or impaired.""' Nevertheless, among all fifty states, Illinois
has the second highest level of per capita pension debt, with $28,880 in unfunded
pension liabilities per person."18
The Illinois Constitution also requires that home rule powers be construed
liberally." 9 Consequently, home rule units may "increase property taxes beyond the
state statutory 'tax cap,'" and may also creatively use their taxing power to resolve

'1 Matthew Dolan, et al., DetriotRising- Life After Bankruptcy, Detriot Free Press (Nov. 8, 2015,
12:03 AM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-reborn/2015/11/08/detroit-rising-lifeafter-bankruptcy/75085252/ [https-//perma.cc/7DQL-CCCS.
n The State Role in Local GovernmentFinancialDistress, supra note 23, at 19.
"' Local Government Financial Planning and Supervision Act, 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 320/5
(West 2016).
11 Frost, supra note 19, at 881.
4Id.

11
116

d

Id. at 883.

§ 5.
n Chuck DeVore, Puerto Rico, Illinois and California:PuicPension Dominoes, FORBES (May
31, 2016, 6:28 PM), http://wwwforbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2016/05/31/puerto-rico-illinoiscalifornia-public-pension-dominoes/#7a3cf22e2f86 [https*//perma.cc/AUN4-KJYR].
119
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(m).
n1 ILL. CONST. art. XII,
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local issues.' 20 Home rule units have taxing authority over anything except income,
occupations, and earnings.' 2 ' Home rule units typically do not need to ask for voter
approval when instituting permissible taxes.12 Illinois home rule cities have no debt
limits.m
i. Chicago; Population: 2.7 million; Annual Budget: $7.84 billion

24

Chicago is a home rule unit under the Illinois Constitution.1 25 The city, a
municipal corporation, is governed by a mayor and a city council.'26
All four of Chicago's defined-benefit retirement funds are significantly
underfunded (having a combined nearly $20 billion shortfall) and have low funding
ratios (the combined funding ratio is 35.5%).12 Recent legislation passed by the
Illinois General Assembly has dramatically increased Chicago's retirement
contribution obligations. Accordingly, the city's supplemental FY 2015 budget and
FY 2016 budget both provided for significantly increased pension contributions.2
Chicago and its four retirement funds share the cost of post-employment
healthcare benefits for some retired city employees; however, Chicago is planning
to phase out such benefits by 2017.129 Chicago's high outstanding pension
obligations have caused the city's debt to rise substantially over the last ten years. 3 0

o
Home
Rule
and
You,
CITIZEN
ADVOC.
CTR.,
1
(2004),
http://www.citizenadvocacycenter.org/uploads/8/8/4/0/8840743/homerulebrochure.pdf
[https*//perma.cc/EL9N-PX9D].
u Id. at 3.
inId2
a Stone, supra note 88, at 2.
124 MAYOR RAHM EMANUEL, CITY OF CHICAGO, 2016 BUDGET OVERVIEW
21, 158,
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp-info/2016Budget/2016BudgetOvervie
wCoC.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZGS3-RE2L].
W
Jon
C.
Teaford,
Home
Rule,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
CHI.,
http://www.encydopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/595.html
[https://perma.cc/BDE5-DL38]
(last
visited Jan. 25, 2017).
u2 CITY OF CHICAGO, GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS, SERIES 2015C, OFFICIAL
STATEMENT 2 (2016), emma.msrb.org/ES756441-ES593475-ES989195.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC8K8TF8] [hereinafter CITY OF CHICAGO, OFFICIAL STATEMENT].
uI d. at S-2.
12 In May 2016, the Illinois legislature overrode a veto from the governor and provided financial
relief to Chicago with respect to its police and fire pension systems. Frank Shafroth, Hard Choices
About a City's Future, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY
PROJECT (Jun. 1, 2016),
https-//fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2016/05/31/hard-choices-about-a-citys-future/
[httpsl//perma.ccIM77G-KEAP]. Consequently, the mayor of Chicago was able to avoid a significant
tax increase. Id.
9 CITY OF CHICAGO, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 126, at S-2.

`0 See Ted Dabrowski, Chicago Slides Toward Bankruptcy, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2015,
4:12 PM), httpl//www.huffingtonpost.com/ted-dabrowski/chicago-slides-toward-ban-b_7287366.html
[https://perma.cc/F5EQ-WJK7].
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In September 2015, Mayor Emanuel proposed a $600 million property tax increase
13
to help the city start making required pension payments.
Over the past ten years, Chicago has experienced operating budget gaps due to
an imbalance of tax revenues relative to expenditures, which are predicted to
continue in FYs 2016-2018 due to continued "operating budget shortfalls and
increased pension obligations." 132 The governor of Illinois has accused Chicago
officials of financial mismanagement, citing the budget impasse and disagreements
with the state over pension and union reforms. 3
Chicago is also affected by the budget deficits experienced by the Chicago
Public Schools ("CPS").'" CPS has a $500 million budget gap.' 35 This is due in
large part to pension "holiday[s]": for example, in 2010, city politicians "passed a
three-year pension 'holiday' that allowed [CPS] to skip $1.2 billion in contributions
to the teacher pension system."136 Union pressure on politicians has also resulted in
generous salary and pension benefits, meaning that city government costs have
risen despite CPS reducing total employment by 14% since

2004

."

After a

teachers' strike in 2012, Mayor Emanuel signed a large salary increase even though
the school district was already underfunded by $1 billion. 3 The governor has
threatened a state takeover of CPS.'
Chicago is also affected by the financial health of the state of Illinois. Illinois
has often delayed its distribution of Chicago's share of Illinois state taxes, due in
part to the state's own budget problems.14 A 2015 report ranked Illinois among the
bottom five least financially- healthy states, primarily due to low amounts of cash
on hand coupled with significant debt obligations.14 ' Nearly a quarter of the money
in Illinois's budget goes to pension payments for its municipalities, meaning that
when Illinois experiences budget difficulties, these challenges directly affect the
state's municipalities.1 42
Although Chicago remains a popular city for both tourists and businesses, the
city is still in substantial debt and suffers from a largely dysfunctional government,
131 Aaron M. Renn, Beneath Chicago's Gloss, CrTY J. (Sept. 24, 2015), httpd/www.cityjournal.org/html/beneatb-chicago%E2%80%99s-gloss-11673.html [https*//perma.cc/TAW7-XPSX].
m CITY OF CHICAGO, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 126, at 61.
m Kelly Bauer, Rauner'sState of the State: Chicago Strangledby FinancialMisnanagement,'
DNA INFO (Jan. 27, 2016, 1:52 PM),
https-//www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20160127/downtown/rauners-state-of-state-chicago-strangled-byfinancial-mismanagement [https://perma.cc/2SVU-CXWH].

m3 CITY OF CHICAGO, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 126, at 62.
13s Renn, supra note 131.
136

13 7

Dabrowski, supra note 130.

138 d

JId
m Bauer, supra note 133.
Crry OF CHICAGO, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 126, at 62-63.
141 Ranking the States by Fiscal Condition, MERCATUS CTR. GEO. MASON
http-//mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Norcross-State-Fiscal-Condition-summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WE48-SDVQ] (last visited Jan. 25, 2017).
142 Bauer, supra note 133.
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complicated by pension underfunding challenges and union pressures. After the
Illinois Supreme Court ruled in 2015 that reforms to Illinois's state pension plans
were unconstitutional, Moody's downgraded the city's credit rating by two notches,
meaning that Chicago's bonds are now rated "junk." 43 Although Chicago may
attempt to seek more formal state assistance, Illinois's own financial woes are likely
to prevent the state from being of much help to the city. Chicago thus illustrates
the overlapping effects of crises at multiple levels of government (state, city, and
school district) on a municipality's financial health and stability. In essence,
Chicago is proof that cities do not exist in a vacuum.
C. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania authorizes its municipalities to file for bankruptcy, but other state
laws make clear that access to Chapter 9 will be granted only as a last resort. The
state's Municipalities Financial Recovery Act, commonly called Act 47, allows the
state to declare municipalities to be financially distressed.'" These municipalities
restructure their debt under the supervision of a financial manager or receiver and
may file for bankruptcy if necessary.1 45 Although several Pennsylvania cities have
been placed under Act 47s protection, they typically remain in the program for
years rather than working their way out of it.1" Scranton, for example, has been
designated as distressed under Act 47 since 1992.17
Although cities may remain in the state's own Act 47 program,'" Pennsylvania
officials seem to discourage municipalities from using the federal bankruptcy
system. For example, state officials' reaction to the city of Harrisburg's 2011
bankruptcy filing illustrates the drastic measures the state took to impede a
bankruptcy filing at any cost. Harrisburg had been authorized to file for
bankruptcy, but when the state legislature enacted last-minute laws removing that
authorization, the bankruptcy court dismissed Harrisburg's case.149 Pennsylvania's
reaction in the wake of Harrisburg's filing may deter other Pennsylvania cities from
considering Chapter 9 relief in the future.

Dabrowski, supra note 130; In re Pension Reform Litig., 32 N.E.3d 1, 28-29 (Ill. 2015).
" Municipalities Financial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 246, No. 47 (1987).
14s Id.
16 David DeKok, Broke, Sharnokin, Pennsylvania, Seeks State Crutcb That Few Cast Off
REUTTERS (May 2, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/artile/2014/05/02/usa-pennsylvaniamunicipals-idUSL2NON91ZV20140502 [https-//perma.cc/492W-2ZH7].
147 Steve McConnell, Westfall Thp.s First-in-the-StateBankruptcy May Not Be Pennsylvania's
Last, TIMEs-TRIB. (Mar. 22, 2010), http-//thetimes-tribune.com/news/westfall-twp-s-first-in-thestate-bankruptcy-may-not-be-pennsylvania-s-last-1.695242 [https://perma.cc/GRM7-P652].
14s For example, the state allows distressed municipalities to "request a tax increase above the
maximum rates allowed by law." Frost, supra note 19, at 879.
149 Juliet M. Moringiello, Specific Authorizationto File under Chapter9: Lessons from Harrisburg,
32 CAL. BANKR.J. 237, 250 (2012).
143

1

2016-2017

Predictors of Municipal Bankruptcies and State Intervention

525

All of Pennsylvania's municipalities and counties may enact home rule charters,
which allow them to set property and personal tax rates for their residents."so Some
cities, such as Altoona, are seeking home rule designations, and the financial
flexibility that comes with them, as a possible way out of Act 47."s' The State of
Pennsylvania as a whole lost 40% of its manufacturing jobs between 1990 and
2009, meaning that many cities are struggling with financial difficulties and may be
closely studying their options for fiscal relief.' 52
15 4
i. Scranton; Population: 77,118;'Annual Budget: $132 million

Scranton, the sixth most populated city in Pennsylvania, is a home rule city and
has had a charter in effect since 1976."' Situated in the northeast corner of the
state, the city is the county seat of Lackawanna County and is part of the larger
Scranton-Wilkes-Barre metropolitan region. For decades, Scranton was a major
regional coal center and the city's economy was largely tied to coal-related
industries, including steel mills and electrical energy production.1s6 In fact,
Scranton earned the nickname the "Electric City," as it was one of the first cities to
have electric lighting installed in many of its buildings."s' Scranton was also the
first U.S. city to operate a completely electric streetcar system.15
Since the Second World War, Scranton's major industries have withered away,
and many have departed entirely. Shrinking industry prospects drove a population
decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when many buildings in the city's historic
"o See A Primer on Home Rule, INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y & ECON. DEV. 3-4 (Aug. 2009),
[https-//perma.cc/JEK2http://www.institutepa.org/PDF/Research/APrimeronHomeRule0809.pdf
QC32]; Kate Lao Shaffner, What is Home Rule?, KEYSTONE CROSSROADS (July 24, 2014),
http://crossroads.newsworks.org/index.php/local/keystone-aossroads/70767-what-is-home-rule/

[https//perma.ec/2STD-2UXC].
'st Shaffner, supra note 150.
152 The State Role in Local Government FinancialDistress, supra note 23, at 30.

Pennsylvania,
City,
S
Scranton
http-//www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/4269000

BUREAU,
CENSUS
U.S.
(last
[https://perma.cc/FCK9-6T24]

visited Jan. 26,2017).
LS
CITY
OF
SCRANTON,
2016
OPERATING
http-//www.scrantonpa.gov/business-admin-docs/2016%200perating%20Budget.pdf

BUDGET,

[https//perma.cc/PN6W-QHJ2].
1s
City
of
Scranton,
Home
Rule
Charter,
SCRANTONPA.GOV,
http//www.scrantonpa.gov/home-rule-charter.htnl [https://perma.cc/3AWS-2JWF] (last visited Jan.

26, 2017).
"6 The Sadness of Scranton: Yet Another American City Strules to Stay Solvent, ECONOMIST
(Jul. 21, 2012), http//www.economist.com/node/21559382 [bttpsdJ/perma.cc/98Z2-5LY7] [hereinafter
The Sadness ofScranton].
15' Cheryl A. Kasbuba, Scranton Gained Fame as the Electric City, Thanks to the Region's
http://thetimes2010),
22,
(Aug.
TIMES-TRIB.
SCRANTON
Spirit,
Innovative
tribune.com/news/scranton-gained-fame-as-the-electric-city-thanks-to-the-region-s-innovative-spirit-

1.965641 [httpsd/perma.cc/52ES-VPYB].
'5'

2013),

Cheryl A. Kashuba, Local 1istorr How Scranton Became Electric, TIMES-TRIB. (May 5,
http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/local-history-how-scranton-became-electric-1.1484082

[https://perma.cc/C5T3-WPFV].
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downtown began to sit vacant."s' With its population in freefall, the city faced
reduced revenues and city leadership had difficulty managing Scranton's fmances.'60
Consequently, in 1992, Scranton entered Act 47.161
Despite the Act 47 protection, Scranton has continued to experience financial
difficulties and has been on the verge of bankruptcy for the past several years. Some
degree of financial mismanagement has likely contributed to Scranton's distress,
particularly in the years following the 2008 financial crisis. The city had a budget
deficit of $21 million in 2013.162 Although Scranton has attempted to increase
revenue through greater efforts at tax collection and rate increase proposals, the city
has been unable to bring in nearly enough money to cover its debt obligations.1 3
City leadership has consistently turned to short term fixes, becoming dependent on
a strategy of "borrowing, asset sales and one-time funding sources."'" In a
desperate attempt to bring in revenue, Scranton began selling off city property that
it later discovered it did not even own.165 City officials' strategies are designed to
generate quick and volatile short-term revenues while ignoring the need to create
long-term, stable revenue sources for the future. In 2012, the city's funds reached a
low of $5,000.'" Borrowing is not a palatable option in Scranton, as the city just
recently received its first credit rating of BB.' 6 7 The city has essentially abandoned
efforts to seek a credit rating until its finances improve and a higher than junk
rating can be pursued. Faced with no other options to pay employees, in July 2012
former mayor Chris Doherty instituted across-the-board salary cuts for all city
employees to the minimum wage.' 8 Overnight, workers such as firemen saw their
pay cut by more than half.' 9 These workers sued, and a judge held that the mayor's
actions were unlawful; the mayor subsequently reinstituted full pay to employees. 7 o
Adding to its already severe financial situation, in October 2011 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ordered Scranton to pay back-pay amounting to $30.9 million to

15'

16

The Sadness ofScranton, supra note 156.
Id

161Id

162
6

Winegarden, supra note 63, at 17.

1 See id

"4 Josh Barro, Scranton: When Your City Needs to Go Bankrupt, BLOOMBERGVIEW (July 19,
2012, 12:34 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2012-07-19/scranton-when-your-cityneeds-to-go-bankrupt [https://perma.cc/XL28-M2AE].

16 The Sadness ofScranton, supra note 156.

167 SeeJim Lockwood, Scranton Gets a Bond Rating, but RatingAgency Critiqueis Stark, TIMESTRIB. (Jun. 17, 2016), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/scranton-gets-a-bond-rating-but-ratingagency-critique-is-stark-1.2056455 [https://perma.cc/98C5-CN7C] (describing how S&P rated an
upcoming Scranton bond issuance as BB, which is a poor rating, but better than the city's prior situation
of not having a credit rating).
"6 See The Sadness of Scranton, supra note 156.
169Id

170 Id.; see also Hilary Russ, Scranton, Pa., Workers Will Get Paidin Full, For
Now, NBC NEWS
(Jul. 24, 2012 5:06 AM), http://business.nbcnews.com/news/2012/07/24/12924619-scranton-paworkers-will-get-paid-in-full-for-now [https://perma.cc/4MCJ-JDZU].
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the police and fire unions as part of an arbitration case that was ultimately decided
in the unions' favor. 171

Scranton is a city that has not fared well despite the state's intervention and
assistance. It therefore illustrates the limitations of state-aid programs and should
serve as a cautionary tale for those, especially in Pennsylvania, who would dissuade
cities from seeking Chapter 9 relief. Scranton demonstrates that Act 47's
effectiveness may be limited. Thus, state officials could instead focus on how Act
47 relief might work well in conjunction with other options, including Chapter 9.
Pennsylvania seems to be heading in this direction already, as the state's Local
Government Commission has become concerned about cities that languish in Act
47 for years.172 Now, all Act 47 municipalities can have a receiver appointed, and
municipalities may remain in Act 47 for only five years. 7 1
D. NewJersey
New Jersey's willingness and ability to assist its distressed municipalities has
varied over the years, depending on the financial health of both the state and the
city involved. In the past, NewJersey state intervention has often taken the form of
provision of modest amounts of "transitional aid" money." Recently, however,
Governor Chris Christie has contracted this program, saying that cities can become
too dependent on state money and expressing a desire for municipalities to become
more self-sufficient. 7 s The state has also created an agency, the Division of Local
Government Services, to proactively monitor local finances and approve budgets."'
The agency must also approve a municipality's request to file for bankruptcy,
however, to date, no city in the state has been approved to file for Chapter 9.'n
Atlantic City has recently been the focus of much attention in New Jersey.
Governor Christie appointed an emergency manager for the city in 2015, and has

.

' See City of Scranton v. Firefighters Local Union No. 60, 29 A.3d 773, 789 (Pa. 2011); Jim
Lockwood, Scranton Back-Pay Settlement IndividualPayouts, InterestStaggering, TDIES-TRIB. (Aug.
http//thetimes-tribune.com/news/scranton-back-pay-settlement-individual-payouts14,
2016),
interest-staggering-12078152 [https://perma.cc/B49S-A39K] ("Scranton cut 848 checks totaling about
$30.9 million to resolve a 13-year fight over back pay owed to Scranton firefighters and police officers.
'n
See 2013 Task Force Report, Local Government Commission, (Oct. 16, 2013),
http-//wwwlgc.state.pa.us/download.cfm~fle-/Reports/act47/101713/Act%2047-of-1987-2013-TaskForce-Report-FINAL-10-16-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LR3-LPTZ] (identifying issues with Act 47
and proposing corrective legislation).

173Jd.

174 Atlantic Citys Watchdogs: How Strong State OversightHelps NewJerseyMunicp idesAvoid
Bankruptcy, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/issue-briefs/2015/08/atlantic-citys-watchdogs [https://perma.cc/4SY4-7ZFU].
17s See id.
176 Id.
177Id
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also asked the city to consider a consensual debt restructuring."' State lawmakers
proposed a "Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act," which would empower the
state to renegotiate Atlantic City's outstanding debt and contracts for up to five
years and enable the state to leverage city assets and make staff cuts." City
officials, however, have criticized the act, saying that it threatens the city's
"sovereignty."o
Such "sovereignty" is important to New Jersey municipalities, which are widely
viewed as having broad home rule protections. Yet, these powers do not extend to
fiscal home rule: many NewJersey statutes contain detailed requirements that affect
budgeting and revenue generation.'"' For example, every NewJersey municipality is
subject to spending caps.'" Yet, nearly all of New Jersey's 566 municipalities have
their own governing body and planning board, indicating at least some measure of
local autonomy.183
New Jersey has also recently received national attention due to the state's large
funding gap for public worker pensions. Although New Jersey's pension system is
among the largest in the country, it is one of the least healthy as well. The state has
more debt per capita owed to just its pension systems than the entire territory of
Puerto Rico owes on its bond debt. 8" Governor Christie cut the state's payment in
2014, leading to a battle with labor unions that the unions ultimately lost.'s New
Jersey's unfunded-pension liability is also caused by "investment losses, increased
benefits and chronic underfunding."" Two of the state's largest funds are projected
to run out of money within twelve years."'
7

Matt Friedman, Sweeney Slams Christie' Atantic City Plan, Says Governor Plans Bankruptcy
for
City,
NJ.COM
(Jan.
29,
2015,
11:39
AM),
http-//www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2Ol5/01/sweeney-slams christies atlantic cityplan.html
[https//perma.cc/P5FD-8ESF]; Hilary Russ, Moody's Slashes Adantic City Rating on Bankruptcy
Potential, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/atlantic-city-ratingsidUSL4NOV255X20150123 [https://perma.cc/rA9E-UV46].
1" Frank Shafroth, Mkihan's Role in Municipal Fiscal Fates, GMU MUN. SUSTAINABILITY
PROJECT (Feb. 23, 2016), https//fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2016/02/23/michigans-role-inmunicipal-fiscal-fates/ [httpsi/perma.cc/B36K-X3EE].
'

180 Id.
181 See John E. Trafford, Home Rule in the '90s: Is it Alve or Dead?, NJ. ST. LEAGUE
MUNICIPAUTIES (1995), http://www.njslom.org/homerule.html [https://perma.cc/X36M-FP4V]
(citing numerous examples of state laws that constrain fiscal home rule, including the New Jersey
Municipal Budget Act, the Local Bond Law, and the Fiscal Affairs Law).

182Id

...
Gloucester Cty. Times Editorial Bd., Home Rule Gives N.J Costly Culture, NJ.COM (Nov. 6,
2011,
3:00
AM),
http://www.nj.com/gloucester/voices/index.ssf/2011/11/home-rule-gives-nj-costly_cult.html
[https-//perma.cc/7TM5-Y47D].

1" DeVore, supra note

118.
185 Samantha Marcus, N.J Publc Worker Pension Fund Gap Widens to 540B,
NJ.COM (Apr. 23,

2015,
5:40
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf2015/04/nj-pension-fundgap
[https*//perma.cc/GS3Y-U7F5].
8
1 6 Id.
8
1 7 Id.
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i. Bayonne; Population:
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Annual Budget: $135.5 million'89

'

Bayonne, a city situated near both New York City and Newark, New Jersey,
became a township in 1861, and was incorporated as a city on March 10, 1869.'0
A mayor and a city council run the city.' 9
Bayonne's financial history is inextricably intertwined with state finances and
politics. In June 2010 the city faced a shortfall of approximately $33 million after
several consecutive years of budget deficits.19 2 Although a state agency was
preparing to take over the city's finances, New Jersey itself was facing a significant
budget deficit, and Governor Christie had campaigned on a promise not to raise
taxes.'' The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey stepped in instead,
purchasing a 131-acre tract of land on the Bayonne waterfront for $235 million.1 94
At the time, Bayonne's mayor stated that there was "no way to avoid a takeover
other than selling off [this] land."' 5 An internal Port Authority memo warned that
the property's sale price was substantially above its appraised value; nevertheless,
officials pushed for approval of the sale to avoid the takeover prospect.' 6 Pursuant
to the purchase contract, the Port Authority's 24-year payment schedule was frontloaded to help Bayonne combat its budget woes." In fact, the first payment to the
city was enough to cover the city's entire budget shortfall."' The Port Authority's
purchase came under scrutiny in 2014, as the waterfront property remained barren
and had not been developed."
Although Bayonne has benefitted from state aid in the past, New Jersey has
fallen short in providing promised funding for the Bayonne school board, and city
taxpayers have borne the brunt of this $2.9 million shortfall.2 1 Officials have
CENSUS
BUREAU,
City,
New
Jersey,
U.S.
18
Bayonne
httpsI//factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/communityfacts.xhtml?src=bkmk
[https//perma.cc/8PMW-HFQ9] (last visited Jan. 26, 2017).
19 Jeannette Josue, Bayonne Opts for 30-Day HiringFreeze to Fll $15M Gap in S135MBudget,
HUDSON COUNTY VIEw (Apr. 21, 2016), http-//hudsoncountyview.com/bayonne-opts-30-day-hiringfreeze-fill-15m-gap-135m-budget/ [https-//perma.cc/87AB-7TXT].
190 CITY OF BAYONNE, $17,305,000 GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS, OFFICIAL
emma.msrb.org/ER891732-EP667464-EP1069240.pdf
(2015),
A-1
STATEMENT,
[https-//perma.cc/X3J4-6RJN].
91
1 Id
192 Russ Buettner, PortAuthority Land Purchase is Boon to Bayonne, and Christie, N.Y. TIMES
(June 8, 2014), http-//www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/nyregion/port-authority-land-purchase-is-boon[https://perma.cc/SRC2-9492].
to-bayonne-and-chris-christie.html?_r-0
193

Id

194

Id.

19s Id. The mayor also stated: "In my opinion, it was desperate." Id.
1197 Id. (noting that the memo was excerpted in court records).

Id.

1 98 See id
200 Jonathan Lin, $2.9M Shortfall in State FundingFell on Bayonne Taxpayers'Backs, Says City
PM),
6:27
2015,
26,
(Nov.
NJ.COM
CFO,
http-//www.nj.com/budson/index.ssf/2015/11/29m-shortfalinstatefunding-fellonbayonne-tax.bt
ml [https-//perma.cc/7SHIU-ECQ3].
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suggested varying reasons for the shortfall: that the board may not have provided
required documentation to the state, that cost over-runs or under-runs would have
impacted the state's payments, or that the board had management problems with
respect to its funding structure.2 0
In May 2015 Moody's gave Bayonne's bond rating a "positive outlook," citing
the city's "improving financial position and reduced reliance on one-time
revenues." 20 2 The Moody's report also noted the "city's substantial tax base and
average wealth levels."" The city's $25 million structural deficit dropped by $4
million in 2015 alone.' And although Bayonne has unfunded pension liabilities,
Moody's considers these "manageable" in light of Bayonne's tax base and improved
cash position.2 0 5
Bayonne's financial situation illustrates the politics sometimes inherent in state
aid and fiscal reform, as state politicians pressured regional authorities to assist the
struggling city. At this time, the city appears to be recovering from its prior fiscal
distress, and further monitoring by both the state and the city may help ensure that
the city remains on a path to fiscal stability. Thus, although Bayonne's rescue may
well have involved fiscal mismanagement, in this case, political maneuverings
benefitted, rather than harmed, the city.

E. Connecticut
Connecticut's involvement in municipal affairs varies depending on the degree
of distress the municipality is experiencing. Connecticut has a formal state
intervention program, which allows for the appointment of a financial control
board that can supervise and restructure local finances. 20 If a municipality
continues to experience distress, Connecticut law authorizes municipal bankruptcy-,
however, any Chapter 9 filing is contingent upon the governor's approval.2 7 In
practice, Connecticut has proven wary of allowing its municipalities to file for
bankruptcy. In 1991, for example, the state successfully challenged the city of

201 Id.
2

Jonathan Lin, Bayonne's Bond Rating Upgradedfrom 'Stable'to 'Positive'byMoody's, NJ.COM
(May
13,
2015,
8:53
PM),
http-//www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2015/05/bayonnes-bond-rating-upgraded-fromstableto-posit.
html2 (quoting Moody's Investor Service).
Id.

204 Id.

'Josellyn Gozalez Yousef 8Malcolm Thompson, Moody's Assigns UnderlyingBaal to Bayonne,
NJ's 2014 A, B &C GO Bonds and EnhancedAa3 to Series 2014 B&C, MOODY'S INV. SERV. (Oct.
24, 2014),
https-//www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-assigns-underlying-Baal-to-Bayonne-NJs2014-A-B--PR_311226 [https://perma.cc/Z9B4-9GJC].
6 See The State Role in Local Government FinancialDistress, supra note 23, at 7, 9,21-22.
Henry C. Kevane, Chapter 9 MunicipalBankruptcy The New 'New Thng? Part I, A.B.A.
Bus. L. TODAY (May 19, 2011), httpi//apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2011/05/artidekevane.shtml [https://perma.cc/VR9V-CG7Y].
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Bridgeport's Chapter 9 filing, forcing the city to abandon its attempt to seek federal
assistance.20
Connecticut towns generally have broad home rule powers, and the state's
Home Rule Act permits any town to adopt its own charter and choose its
government structure. Both Connecticut towns in the authors' sample have home
rule charters.210 Nevertheless, Connecticut's "General Assembly has preempted
local control in areas involving . .. fiscal matters," 211 and Connecticut courts have
upheld these preemption measures. 212 In cases of fiscal instability, the state may
even impose financial controls on municipalities.213
i. West Haven; Population: 54,927;214Annual Budget: $151 million215
Originally settled in the seventeenth century, West Haven became a bedroom
community due to its location along the major transportation corridor between
Boston and New York.216 Despite its promising location, West Haven has
struggled since its incorporation. Although the city collaborates with state and
regional transit corporations to develop projects increasing the city's accessibility for
transit riders, West Haven has little industry of its own and has struggled to raise
revenue. 2 17 City leaders have largely ignored West Haven's cash flow problem,
preferring instead to invest in schools and infrastructure projects that West Haven
218
may ultimately have trouble paying for.

m George Judson, US. judge Blocks Bridgeportfrom Bankruptcy Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2,
1991), http-//www.nytimes.com/1991/08/02/nyregion/us-judge-blocks-bridgeport-from-bankruptcycourt.html [https://perma.cc/ATE9-HQ5C].
" An Act Concerning the Home Rule, 1957 Conn. Pub. Acts 671, 672.
210 See FRANK B. CONNOLLY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTICUT (3d ed. 2013) (ebook).
211 Janice C. Griffith, Connecticuts Home Rule. The Judicial Resolution of State and Local
Condicts, 4 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 177, 226 (1983).
212 E.g., Larke v. Morrissey, 230 A.2d 562, 567 (Conn. 1967) (noting that Municipal Auditing Act
preempts city charter provision authorizing city council to designate an auditor).
213 See Griffith, supra note 211, at 226-27.
West Haven Town, New Haven Count, Connecticut, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
214
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PSTO45214/0900982870/embed/accessible
[https://perma.cc/4N84-HTSC].
215 CITY OF WEST HAVEN, APPROVED OPERATING BUDGET FISCAL YEAR 2014-15 (2014),
[https-//perma.cc/E8FC-M5R7]
http://www.cityofwesthaven.com/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/47
[hereinafter WEST HAVEN, APPROVED OPERATING BUDGET 2014-2015].
216 See CITY OF WEST HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS COMPRISED
OF: $38,715,000 GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS (FEDERALLY TAXABLE), ISSUE OF 2014, SERIES A,
OFFICIAL STATEMENT, 16 (Aug. 20, 2014), emma.msrb.org/EA635169-EA497012-EA893445.pdf
[https-//perma.cc/MA3M-NP77].
217 Ste id. at 22-23.
218 See West Haven in Dire FiscalSituation; General FundDeticit Grows by $750K, Cash Flow a
Problem,
MIDDLETOWN
PRESS
(Apr.
14,
2015,
6:32
PM),
http-//www.middletownpress.com/article/NH/20150414/NEWS/150419737 [https://perma.cc/BJ6TTXJA].
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Due to this imbalance between revenues and spending, the city is facing a
deficit of approximately $7,500,000.219 To rectify this problem, West Haven has
re-focused on infrastructure and transportation developments. The city has
partnered with local, state, and private enterprises to take advantage of a newly
constructed rail station from New York City, using the station as a focal point for
Transit-Oriented Development ("TOD") that the city hopes will give it a college
town feel and encourage travelers to visit the downtown area.220 In the past, TODs
have proven to be lucrative concepts for other cities, combining increased transit
accessibility with attractive destinations. Generally speaking, a community that
focuses on TOD tends to increase its property values. 1
Poor governmental decision-making and a lack of a concrete industry base have
resulted in budget imbalances for West Haven. Yet, the city's location has given it
the opportunity to remake itself through transit-oriented infrastructure
developments. In addition, although Connecticut has not itself provided direct
financial assistance to the city, it has been willing to work with West Haven to
encourage development that may ultimately benefit the state and region as well as
the city itself. Thus, West Haven provides an example of a city taking advantage of
regional development and coordination opportunities, even though Connecticut's
policy with respect to state intervention is relatively hands-off.
F Aizona
Arizona gives its local governments a large amount of autonomy. Although
Arizona law unconditionally allows the state's distressed municipalities to file for
federal bankruptcy relief, the law does not provide for any alternative forms of relief
for local governments, such as state intervention programs, with the exception of
programs for school districts.2
Arizona has some of the most stringent TELs in the country. It is one of only
six states in the U.S. with both a binding property tax limit and a general
expenditure limit imposed on its municipalities.'
As a right-to-work state, 224 Arizona is not generally considered to be unionfriendly, but the state does have strong constitutional protections for public

219 WEST HAVEN, APPROVED OPERATING BUDGET 2014-2015, supra note 215.
2 See UNION STATION TRANSP. CTR.: TRANSIT-ORIENTED DEV. PLAN (2013),
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/uploads/UnionStationTODPlan-Sep2Ol3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TWV5-R4JT].
221 See John L. Renne, From Transit-Adjacentto Transit-OrientedDevelopment, 14 LOC. ENvr
1,4-5 (2009).
2 The State Role in Local Government FinancialDistress, supra note 23, at 8.
See Cities& State Fiscal Structure2015, supra note 43, at 11-12.
n^ Right to work laws allow employees to decide individually whether or not to join or financially
support a union. Currently, 28 states have right to work laws. Right to Work States, NAT'L RIGHT TO
WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND., (2017), www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-states [https://perma.cc/S23LWV8N].
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pensions. In 1998, voters passed a constitutional amendment stating that "public
retirement benefits shall not be diminished or impaired." 22 5
"The . . . Arizona Constitution imposes a formula-based spending limit on

Arizona cities and towns;" however, the constitution also provides that municipal
voters can approve a so-called "Home Rule" Option, in which a municipality
"adopt[s] its own budget limits ... based on local needs, service levels and available
resources."" In the case of the city of Glendale, voters initially approved a rule
requiring voter approval of expenditure limits based on the city's actual revenues. 22 7
In 2000, however, Glendale voters approved a permanent base adjustment,
removing the need for further approval of expenditure limits."
i. Glendale; Population: 240,126;22 Annual Budget: $632 milliono
Glendale is a suburban city bordering the Arizona state capital, Phoenix.23
From 2003 to 2009, Glendale made aggressive infrastructure investments to market
itself as a destination city.232 During this time, the city built three new sports
venues intended to bring economic development benefits to the area.
Unfortunately, Glendale neglected to focus on development outside of the context
of sports venues. This mistake became apparent in 2011, when stadium investors
defaulted, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on one of the stadiums, and the
city as a whole began an economic decline.234
'2 Craig Harris & Beth Duckett, Arizona Pensions Not Easil Reined In, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (May
8, 2013, 10:00 AM), http-//www.azcentral.com/news/politics/artides/20130425arizona-pensions-noteasily-reined.html [https-//perma.cc/CDD4-F9F2].
6 What is 'Home Rule?," ORO VALLEY, https//www.orovalleyaz.gov/town/departments/townclerk/what-home-rule [https*//perma.cc/S9VQ-75DK] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
GLENDALEAZ.COM,
http://www.glendaleaz.com/budget/faqs.cfm
2
Budget
FAQs,
[https://perma.cc/6843-8ZE7] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) (describing how voters approved this
requirement via approval of Home Rule).
228 Id.
229
Glendale
City,
Arizona,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/0427820 [https://perma.cc/P8DN-WX3R] (last
visited Jan. 27, 2017).
2
Voting
Meeting
Agenda,
GLENDALEAZ.COM
2
(Jun.
9,
2015),
[bttps//perma.cc/9WH2http://www.glendaleaz.com/budget/documents/FimalBudgetAdoption.pdf
742S].
231 CITY OF GLENDALE, ARiZONA, $38,300,000 GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS,

SERIES 2010, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, A-1 (2010), emma.msrb.org/EA436666-EA339652EA735495.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBB8-ZDF6] [hereinafter CITY OF GLENDALE, OFFICIAL
STATEMENT].
232 See West Valley Sound Off Investingin Sports Tourism, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Apr. 15, 2014, 9:49
AM), http://www.azcentr-al.com/story/news/local/glendale/2014/04/15/west-valley-sound-off-sportstourism/7738621/ [https://perma.cc/4V5F-47HB].
m See id.

m

See Rebekah L. Sanders, ForeclosuresExpected to Put Glendale Westgate City Center on New
Track,
ARIZ.
REPUBLIC
(Oct.
26,
2011,
9:02
AM),
http://www.azcentral.com/news/artides/2011/10/26/20111026glendale-westgate-foreclosures-newtrack.html [https*//perma.cc/7YHW-C73S].
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Glendale's woes worsened when an investigation into financial mismanagement
regarding pension liability uncovered an illegal scheme to make up a $14.4 million
budget shortfall in 2008 and resulted in the firing of four city officials and the
implication of a former city manager.23 The financial problems stemmed from a

vaguely analyzed and grossly misrepresented early retirement program the city
council had approved.' Despite these setbacks, Glendale was able to mnage
many of its difficulties by adopting cost-saving measures including a "hiring freeze,
mandatory furloughs, [and] ongoing base budget reductions." 7 In 2015, ratings
agencies upgraded the city's bond rating, attributing the improvement to Glendale's
moderate economic rebound, growth in the city's tax base, the regional housing
recovery, and prudent budget management by city officials.m The city also
negotiated a cut in arena management fees for one of the city-owned arenas,
thereby reducing its financial exposure to the professional sports market.
Arizona's hands-off approach to local government distress does not seem to
have harmed Glendale's prospects for fiscal stability. Although city officials in
Glendale had substantial autonomy to propose and invest in infrastructure
development, they were also able to take steps to rectify problems that arose from
this development without the need to turn to the state for assistance. Thus,
Glendale illustrates how municipal autonomy may work both to a city's detriment
and to its benefit.
G. Califbnia
California has long resisted state intervention for its distressed municipalities,
even when those municipalities are in bankruptcy. 2 4 Over the past ten years, the
California cities of Vallejo, Stockton, and San Bernardino have all filed for Chapter
9 relief, but the state government has offered no help to any of these cities. 241
235 Caidin McGlade, Glendale Audit Fallout: 4 Officials on Leave, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 26,
2013, 10:29 AM), http://archive.azcentral.com/community/gendale/artides/20130824audit-falloutofficials-leave-prog.html [https-//perma.cc/J9FD-KHFU]; CITY OF GLENDALE, ARIZ., SPECIAL
PROJECT:
SUMMARY
OF
FINDINGS
AND
CONCLUSIONS
4
(Aug.
20,
2013),
http//www.glendaleaz.com/documents/SpecialProject-SummaryofFindingsandCondusions.pdf
[https//perma.cc/AM93-ABHJ].
2" See Haralson, Miller, Pitt, Feldman & McAnally, PLC, et al, Special Project: Summary of
Pindings
and
Conclusions,
GLENDALEAZ.COM
6
(Aug.
20,
2013),
https-//www.glendaleaz.com/documents/SpecialProject-SummaryofFindingsandConclusions.pdf
[https:/perma.cc/6JN8-XNH3].
3
' CITY OF GLENDALE, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 231, at A-7.
a Paul Giblin, Glendale's Bond Rating Improves After Years of Turmoil, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb.
3, 2016, 10:24 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/glendale/2016/02/03/glendales-bondrating-improves-after-years-turmoil/79648828/
[https*//perma.cc/ER6R-NUTS].
23 9

1d

24 See The State Role in Local Government

wnancial Distress, supra note 23, at 39-41 (discussing
California's belief that its cities should operate independently from the state); Shafroth, Protectingthe
Ability to Provide Essential Public Services, supra note 101 (discussing bankrupt California
municipalities of Vallejo, Stockton, and San Bernardino and state intervention).
241 Shafroth, ProtectingtheAbility to ProvideEssentialPubhc Services, supra note 101.
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Indeed, California has no formal state assistance or intervention mechanism for its
municipalities, although the state does place conditions on their ability to utilize
the federal bankruptcy system.22 In contrast to its treatment of local governments,
California does intervene when its school districts exhibit distress, most notably
through the extension of emergency loans. 243
Local officials and residents do not appear to resent the state's lack of
intervention, and some have even expressed their preference that the state not
become involved in local affairs.2 A few years ago, when then-State Treasurer Bill
Lockyer pushed for a system that would allow state officials to proactively examine
municipal finances and offer technical assistance, the state's municipalities resisted
these reforms out of concern that they would enable the state to encroach on home
rule powers and to provide assistance that would ultimately favor employee unions,
whose representatives were seen as having close ties with state lawmakers.245
Lockyer's proposal is reminiscent of an earlier bill state lawmakers passed in 1995,
which sought to create a Local Area Bankruptcy Committee to proactively monitor
municipalities.2 " Then-Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the bill out of concern that it
would inappropriately provide the state with the ability to infringe on local
authority. 247

Consistent with its hands-off approach, California grants home rule powers to
its charter cities. All three of the California cities in this sample are charter cities,
meaning that voters can determine how their city government is organized and that
these cities have supreme authority over municipal affairs.2" Charter cities generally
have more power to assess and levy taxes than other California cities; however, the
imposition of taxes and assessments is still subject to Proposition 218, which
requires voter approval before certain tax increases can take effect, including service
charges, assessments,249 and any limitations the charter city may choose to impose
itself. Charter cities may impose business license taxes unless limited by the state or
federal constitutions, and they may also impose a real property transfer tax.2 50
242 Specifically, California requires municipalities to engage in a sixty day "neutral evaluation
process" with local unions and creditors prior to receiving authorization to file. The State Role in Local
Government FinancialDistress, supra note 23, at 40.
243 Id. at 39-41.
24 Id. at 20-23.
245 Id. at 39-41.
2- S.B. 349, 1995-96 Sess. (Cal. 1995).
247 Frederick Tung, After Orange County- Reforming CaliforniaMunicipal Bankruptcy Law, 53
HASTINGS L.J. 885, 903 (2002).
bttp://www.cacities.org/ResourcesLEAGUE
CAL.
CITIES,
248
Charter Cities,
[https-//perma.cc/QBW6-8VPH]
Documents/Resources-Section/Charter-Cities/Cbarter_Cities-List
(last visited Jan. 27, 2017); see generally CAL. CONST. art. X1, § 5(b) (delineating authority cities have
over municipal affairs).
249
What
is
Proposition
218?,
CAL.
TAX
DATA,
http://www.californiataxdata.com/pdf/proposition218.pdf

[https-//perma.cc/QSH7-SQAGI

(last

visited Jan. 19,2017).
2 GeneralLaw City v. CharterCity, LEAGUE CAL. CIES, http://www.cacities.org/ResourcesDocuments/Resources-Section/Charter-Cities/ChartGeneralLawv-_CharterCities-07-26-11
[https://perma.cc/N9CW-VXFM] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
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Courts in California have consistently held that how a city spends its tax dollars is a
"municipal affair," meaning that California charter cities have considerable
'

authority over expenditures.25
The combination of minimal state assistance with financial affairs and
significant home rule authority has largely allowed California cities to determine
their own paths for relief. Although the state has placed conditions on
municipalities' ability to file for bankruptcy relief, these barriers are far from
insurmountable, as demonstrated by the three California cities in the sample that
have recently filed for bankruptcy.
i. Irvine; Population: 256,927; 252Annual Budget: $172 million25 3
Irvine was one of California's earliest planned cities. Originally intended for
agriculture and ranching, the city was subdivided for residential use in the 1960s.2 5 4
Irvine has an affluent population, reflected in real estate prices that are high even by
California's standards.2 55 Despite Irvine's stable tax base and valuable real estate,
the city has had difficulty raising tax revenue. 25 6 Irvine's revenue difficulties are
likely linked to Proposition 13, a state law that, since 1978, has limited the
property tax rate to 1% of the property's full cash value.25 7 Irvine is also located
within Orange County, which filed for bankruptcy in the 1990s. 25 8 Proposition 13
similarly limited Orange County's ability to rectify its fiscal distress.25 9
Several groups have lobbied to amend or change Proposition 13 to allow
California cities more access to property tax revenue.2' California's property tax
limitations have hindered Irvine, an otherwise affluent city, from being able to take

SeeJohnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990, 1002 (Cal. 1992).
Irvine
City,
California,
U.S.
Census
Bureau,
http//www.censiis.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/0636770
[https://perma.cc/J8CA-HSEB]
(last
visited Jan. 27, 2017).
2
City
of
vine,
Califonia:
2015-16
Budget,
CITY
IRVINE,
http//legacy.cityofsrvine.org/civica/flebank/blobdload.asp?BloblD=27428
[https//perma.cc/Q3YH6EL3] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
' Ellen Bell, Irvine was Biggest New Town' Experiment, IRVINE CO., (Feb. 11, 2014),
http//150.irvinecompany.com/irvine-biggest-new-town-experiment/ [https://perma.cc/N297-9QMF].
251
252

25 See generallyCITY OF IRVINE, $126,220,000 LIMITED OBLIGATION IMPROVEMENr BONDS
DISTRICT
NO.
12-1,
OFFICIAL
STATEMENT
(Jul.
11,
2012),

REASSESSMENT

http-//emma.msrb.org/ER611647-ER474950-ER877960.pdf[https://perma.cc/YP4G-FCGN].
25

Id

m Michael Gervais & Dontae Rayford, In Pursuit of Equity in Property Tax Allocation:
Discussingthe lawed Implementation ofProposition13, 30 VA. TAX REV. 761, 764 (2011).
" Floyd Norris, Orange County's Banknpty- The OveMew Orange County Crisisjolts Bond
Market, N.Y. TUIES (Dec. 18, 1994), http-//www.nytimes.com/1994/12/08/business/orange-county-sbankruptcy-the-overview-orange-county-crisis-jolts-bond-market.html
[httpsi/perma.cc/BH6P-

XJKZ].
259

Id.

260 Joe

Eskenazi, Prop 13: The Buiding-Sized Loopholes Corporations Exploit, CLOSE
LOOPHOLE (Jan. 4, 2012), http-//dosetheloophole.com/sf-weekly-prop-13 [httpsi//perma.cc/7A9H-

8YW3].
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maximum advantage of the potential revenue sources available to it. The city would
have much greater fiscal potential if it could adjust the property tax to better
capture the wealth of its residents. Of course, raising property taxes also comes with
a cost: the threat of driving residents away. To overcome its difficulty with tax
revenue, Irvine recently approved proposals to issue special tax bonds to fund
infrastructure in certain neighborhoods and formed a special district where
residents pay extra taxes for certain services.26 Critics have decried these moves as
"maneuver[s] around Proposition 13," and it remains to be seen whether these
efforts will be effective in enabling Irvine to tap into more resources from its
residents.262
Irvine has also exhibited strong evidence of fiscal mismanagement. The city
channeled a large amount of funds toward creating the Great Orange County
Park,' a park that was financially infeasible and rife with unethical-and possibly
illegal-business deals and spending.' Former Mayor Larry Agran has primarily
been implicated in decisions that ultimately led to spending over $350 million on a
park that cost $65 million to build.2 65 The governor of California eventually
ordered that development on the park be stopped."'
ii. Stockton; Population: 305,658;"Annual Budget: $610 million"
Stockton filed for bankruptcy on June 28, 2012.11 Although the judge in
Stockton's bankruptcy ruled that pension obligations could be modified, the city
elected not to impair its obligations in the bankruptcy.?o The 2008 recession and
the resulting housing and financial collapse significantly contributed to Stockton's
261 Tomoya Shimura, Homeowners in Irvine's Beacon Park Face Between $4,455 and $14,387in
Extra
Taxes,
THE
ORANGE
CTY.
REGISTER
(Aug.
6,
2016
4:42
PM),
www.ocregister.com/artides/park-724359-great-property.html [https//perma.cc/G4HZ-J6YH].
262 Id
2 Matt Morrison, Final Great ParkAudit Report Cites Mismanagement, FTnancial Waste, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2015, 7:02 PM), http://wwwlatimes.com/tn-dpt-me-0327-great-park-audit20150324-story.html [https://perma.cc/XUA4-K88M].
2" See generally CITY OF IRVINE, GREAT PARK AUDIT: REPORT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL (Mar.
http-/agranaudit.com/wp-content/uploads/greatparkaudit-specialreport.pdf
2015),
24,
[https://perma.cc/WF9-2FX5] (discussing the financial feasibility of creating Great Orange County
Park).
265 Id. at 114.
2" Id. at 7, 11, 30, 48.
26

Stockton

City,

California,

U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU,

https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/0675000 [https-//perma.cc/G346-W2XE] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2017).
2
CITY OF STOCKTON FY 2015-2016 ANNUAL BUDGET A-3 (2015-16),
http-//www.stocktongov.com/files/2015-16_AdoptedBudget_394_pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C5A55Z7].
9
STOCKTON PUBLIC FINANCING AUTHORITY, $13,020,000 LIMITED OBLIGATION REVENUE
BONDS (MOSHER REASSESSMENT DISTRICT 2014-1), SERIES 2014, at 3 (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://emma.msrb.org/EA633310-EA495523-EA891972.pdf[https//perma.cc/TP3G-GLQ7].
27
o See Shafroth, Protectingthe Abilty to ProvideEssentialPublc Services, supranote 101.

Vol. 105

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

538

'

financial woes, but the city's unaffordable pensions and benefits and an ill-timed
bond offering played a significant role as well. 27
Stockton struggled in the period leading up to its bankruptcy as well as during
the bankruptcy proceedings themselves. During the bankruptcy, the city reduced its
workforce by 30% and cut its budget by $90 million.272 After Stockton emerged
from bankruptcy, it still owed approximately $48 million in settlements and other
obligations.273
Clearly, bankruptcy did not resolve many of Stockton's key problems, including
the city's unfimded pension liability, which could have been addressed in the
bankruptcy case, but was not due to political pressures.
iii. San Bernardino; Population: 215,108;274 Annual Budget: $28 million27 5
San Bernardino filed for bankruptcy in 2012 and has remained in bankruptcy
for over four years." Rising pension costs, growing unemployment, and declining
property and sales tax revenues all contributed to the city's fiscal decline, though
poor governmental decision-making in better economic cycles also played a role.2 77
The city's charter was considered "dysfunctional" and "a barrier to efficient,
effective government because it is overly complex, hard to understand, and contains
elements that are inconsistent with best practices for modern municipal
government."2 78 The city's precarious fiscal condition was further exacerbated by
the 2008 recession, as San Bernardino was particularly hard-hit by the housing bust
and declining state revenues. Even without the recession, however, observers
271
272

See Fudge, supra note 77; Winegarden, supra note 63, at 12-13.
Robin Respaut, Tnal Starts Monday to DetermineifStockton Can Exit Bankruptcy, REUTERS

(May 11, 2014, 7:00 AM), http-//www.reuters.com/artide/2014/05/11/municipals-stockton-previewidUSL2NONV1BO20140511 [https://perma.cc/2QEL-TEMP).
2" Roger Phillips, Stockton Bankruptcy Cost: More than $41 Million, RECORDNET.COM (Oct.
28,
2014,
7:57
PM),
bttp-//www.recordnet.com/artide/20141028/NEWS/141029525
[https://perma.cc/4W6A-C4GE].
2

San

Bernardino

City,

California,

U.S.

CENSUS

BUREAU,

httpsJ/factfmder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community-facts.xhtml?src=bkmk
[https://perma.cc/42XL-LCQ9] (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
m

CITY

OF

SAN

BERNARDINO,

CIP

BUDGET,

FY

2014-15,

httpi//www.ci.san-

bernardino.ca.us/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BloblD=17311 [https://perma.cc/JZ9P-KFM6].
276 See Ryan Hagen, Major Step Foward for San Bernarno Bankruptcy, SUN (Apr. 1, 2016,
5:48 PM), http-//www.sbsun.com/government-and-politics/20160401/major-step-forward-for-sanbernardino-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/KER4-J37U1.
2" See Steven Church et al., San Bernardino Files Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Early, BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
3,
2012),
http://fixpacifica.blogspot.com/2012/08/san-bernardino-files-chapter-9.html
[httpsi//perma.cc/5NGE-8BUJ].
m PROGRESS REPORT OF THE CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE, CITY SAN BERNARDINO (Feb.
16,
2016),
http://sanbernardinocityca.iqm2.com/citizens/DetailLegiFile.aspx?MeetinglD=1746&ID=4312
[https://perma.cc/W4XU-33SW]; see ako Frank Shafroth, Schooling on Municipal Solvency, GMU
MUN.

SUSTAINABILrY

PROJECT

(Feb.

16,

https//fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2016/02/16/schooling-on-municipal-solvency/
[https*//perma.cc/3LRD-VWE3].

2016),
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believe that San Bernardino was on an unstoppable path to insolvency, due to
unfunded pension liabilities and retirement benefits for city workers. 2 79 In
particular, San Bernardino has struggled with costly police and fire union
contracts, 2 8 and the city is of course subject to the same property tax limitations as
every other California municipality.281
Since filing for bankruptcy, San Bernardino has continued to default on
82
payments and has had difficulty coming up with a viable plan of debt adjustment.
As it engaged in legal battles with several of its creditors, San Bernardino saw its
agreements with other public organizations take a hit. For example, S&P recently
downgraded its rating on bonds issued to the San Bernardino Joint Powers
Financing Authority, noting that even though the bonds' pledged revenues did not
come from the city's general fund, the city's actions nevertheless evinced a general
unwillingness to pay debt service.283 Notably, despite its precarious financial
situation, San Bernardino has continued to make payments to CALPERS, its
largest pension creditor, to the dismay of the city's bondholders, who may be paid
cents on the dollar upon San Bernardino's exit from bankruptcy?
In San Bernardino, government mismanagement, a strong union presence, high
pension costs, restraints on taxing power, and a lack of concrete aid from the state
have all combined to mire the city in financial woes, only some of which
bankruptcy will be able to address.
iv. Vallejo; Population: 121,253; 28 5Annual Budget: $185 million2 8
Vallejo, a chartered city governed by a mayor and a city council, filed for
bankruptcy in May of 2008, citing exorbitant salaries and benefits for its unionized

a Winegarden, supra note 63, at 12.

See id. (explaining that the money owed to CALPERS, the California Public Employees'
Retirement System, increased by $17 million since filing for bankruptcy).
281

Norris,

supra note 258.

San BernardinoHas Defaultedon $10 Milbon in Bond Payments, CNBC (Mar. 18, 2015, 8:14
http-//www.cnbc.com/2015/03/18/san-bernardino-has-defaulted-on-10-million-in-bondAM),
payments.html [https://perma.cc/5K5D-T242]; Keeley Webster, Insurer, Bondholders Slan San
Bernardino
on
Financials,
BOND
BUYER
(Dec.
18,
2015),
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/insurer-bondholders-slam-san-bernardino-onfinancials-1092159-1.htmL
2m See SAN BERNARDINO JOINT POWERS FINANCING ATTHoRTFY TAx ALLOCATION BONDS,
http://emma.msrb.org/IssueView/IssueDetails.aspx?id=ER340026
(2010),
SCALE
FINAL
[https://perma.cc/TG6N-5XE2] (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
' San Bernardino Has Defaulted on $10 Million in Bond Payments, supra note 282; see also
Webster, supra note 282.
S
Vallejo
City,
California,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
[https://perma.cc/KQ3Lhttpl//www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/0681666/accessible
WSQG] (last visited Jan. 28, 2017).
2" CITY OF VALLEJO, ADOpTED BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2015-2016 (June 9, 2015),
86
2
[https-//perma.cc/JP2Chttp://www.ci.vallejo.ca.us/common/pages/DisplayFile.aspx?itenId= 85 1
BFQJ [hereinafter CITY OF VALLEJO, ADOFFED BUDGET].
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firefighters and police officers as some of the principal causes.' Three consecutive
years of budget shortfalls also contributed to Vallejo's financial position.2 " At the
time Vallejo's city council voted to enter bankruptcy, the city faced a $16 million
deficit with no money in reserve for the following fiscal year.' Other contributors
to Vallejo's decline included the city's "weak housing market, overly optimistic
budget savings estimates, worse than expected transportation deficits, [and]
mandated pension increases."29
Vallejo used bankruptcy to restructure its general fund obligations, including
certain certificates of participation. In addition, Vallejo reduced services and
renegotiated with employee unions regarding collective bargaining agreements.2
Labor costs were the largest piece of the city's pre-bankruptcy budget.2 9 Vallejo
emerged from bankruptcy in November of 2011.' Union leaders played a powerful
role in the city's bankruptcy, opposing the city's actions at nearly every step in the
bankruptcy process and running up litigation costs that ultimately diminished the
city's ability to repay its creditors, including union members themselves. 294
Vallejo's bankruptcy is thus somewhat of a mixed success. Since exiting
bankruptcy, the city has continued to struggle with pension debt and the provision
of basic public services. Vallejo's city manager has remarked that the police
department is still "woefully understaffed."29 5 The city also struggled to access the
debt markets upon emergence from bankruptcy. One post-bankruptcy analysis
concluded that because Vallejo could not meaningfully reduce labor costs, the
bankruptcy had been unsuccessful.296
These case studies (and the additional studies in the Appendix) illustrate the
diverse approaches states take toward municipal control and fiscal distress. They
shed light on the benefits and drawbacks of various levels of state intervention and
constraints. Importantly, these studies demonstrate that the question of how much
2''

SERIES

CITY OF VALLEJO, CALIFORNIA, $18,080,000 WATER REVENUE REFUNDING BONDS,

2013,

at

9

[https://perma.cc/55S3-YQ8N]
BONDS].

(2013),

http://emma.msrb.org/EP770913-EP597624-EP999001.pdf

[hereinafter VALLEJO $18,080,000 WATER REVENUE REFUNDING

2 Bobby White, Bankruptcy Exit Approved for City, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 6, 2011),
http-//www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111903885604576486402778541450
[https-//perma.cc/FFP7-UW4W].
I Carolyn Jones, FinancialyAiling Vallejo Fdes Bankruptcy, SF GATE (May 24,2008,4-00 AM),

http://www.sfgate.com/bayarealartilde/Flnandally-ailing-Vallejo-files-bankruptcy-3283300.php

[https://perma.cc/V2H8-DTEN].
m Fudge, supra note 77.
VALLEJO $18,080,000 WATER REVENUE REFUNDING BONDS, supra note 287, at 3.
an Id. at 8.
2 3
291

Id. at 3.

29

See Karol K. Denniston, NeutralEvaluation in Chapter9 Bankruptcies AitigatingMunicipal

Distress, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 261, 274 (2012).
29

(Mar.

' Melanie Hicken, Once Bankrupt, Vallejo Still Can'tAfford its PriceyPensions, CNN MONEY
10,
2014,
10:44
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/10/pf/vallejo-pensions/

[https://perma.cc/53M7-T83F].
296 Jane Wells, A
New Chapter for

Valejo,

CNBC

http://www.cnbc.com/id/43932782 [https://perma.cc/2TNE-PLSU].

(ul.

28,

2011,

5-05
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money, freedom, or resources a state provides its municipalities cannot be viewed in
isolation. Instead, these questions must be examined within the entire framework
of the legal, economic, and political constraints that shape the municipality's ability
to anticipate and respond to fiscal distress.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Findings 7
Table X - Consoildted Table

N

gumte

CY

P1
*ehatv
tasI(asprpww
O=lYorN)

I

Htem
rina. U

P01m.

P)
Tu&hpit

IntergenrwfamiA
er eAere* enW
anrup LMo PhAM
to"lIstrnu

01

1

Lrude

UrtnManrh p

A-rg

Whity

uNRdA
tin

Low

High

Hgh

Hgh

I*gh

Moeh

MW

High

Hgh

Low

4gh

MarON

Moaeb

High

High

Hgh

HIth

Mofb

Low

LOw

Low

N

Low

Mob@IP

Kgh

Imne

Calferls

241531

N

Low

Hgh

High

Mo

gewmhmne

CaOrs

2s1Il

y

Low

High

Hgh

Y

Low

)Kgh

a0som

I

(MDArsNy

Hgh

23T17

l

eb

V.0.

caretrn.

12021

Low

Mgh

Ngb

Mob1se

MowNul

New910

cone-um

7a71

N

Mgh

Lw

Low

Mobeb

Hgh

West H-m

CnnitItA

5405

N

High

Law

Low

Mobile

Hig

)gh

Low

Mobe

MoeS

MeASh

14gh

Hith

gh

chos

Inhon

7ms

N

11Men

ind..

SN4

N

Hgh

Hgh

Modees

OMis

eGe

N

Mobile

14gh

Mab

N

N1a1m1

Low

Low

L4w

Mobile

H4gh

MNobie

elmort

Maryel

12273

DtIm

Mmtaea

05

NohLVq.

Nevde

250M

N

gh

Mobe

tes.

No.Jmery

£371

N

ModS

MoAee

Im.yCAy

Ne.Jesy

212144

N

Mobs

NwYrk

4M2fl

N

.14gh

NwYor

12312

N

Nim

PM

u1c

TMger

"mmgre

Mobie

Arte-e

Crri,

btrvAWafter

i
rerile

MO*"

LOW

own"te

stoK

~

RM
MuIPa

gh

MobS

gh

Lw

Low

HNth

Mawr

HIgh

Low

Law

H1gh

Low

High

Hgh

gh

Hih

Modebs

La

Low

Me10

High

Hth

Hgh

MawoeS

Kagh

Hgh

mgh'

Mgh

gh

High

MsHgh

Nb

H.
Nth

Lw

Low

MoAb

Hi

MobS

1gh

Hgh

Hgh

Low

Lw

Modre

MobrS

Lw

High

Lw

Law

High

Lw

Mows

Modbrs

Lw

High

Hih

Low

Hgh

gh

Low

gh

Oant

onvmrvet

IM2

N

Low

Mobi

MobH MMaori

Proient

fhodef

d

174111

N

Rgh

Mel0e

Mobs

High

Ugh

ANS
Molrdf
High

Table 10 summarizes the authors' findings regarding the most prevalent factors
influencing municipal behavior toward fiscal distress. Union density, unfunded
pension liability, and financial mismanagement had the greatest impact, occurring
with a "high" coding in sixteen, twelve, and eleven, respectively, of the nineteen
cities in the authors' sample. Furthermore, at least one of these three factors had a
"high" impact in every city in the sample. The authors' findings therefore suggest
that state and local governments should be proactive in monitoring these three
factors and their relationship to fiscal distress. To the extent that distress has
already occurred in a municipality, leaders should focus heavily on resolving the
issues raised by these factors.
How exactly should political leaders address these issues? Although there are no
easy answers, the research raises several points worthy of consideration. First, the
case studies reinforce the notion that municipalities truly are creatures of the state
in which they are located. The relationship between state and municipality,
m See infra Key to Table X.
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particularly with respect to laws and policies impacting fiscal home rule, has a
direct impact on the freedom municipalities have to devise creative solutions to the
problems they face. For example, despite being broadly viewed as having substantial
home rule authority, New Jersey municipalities lack Fiscal home rule authority and
therefore often find themselves at the mercy of the state to provide aid or devise
creative solutions to their problems. Thus, awareness of a particular municipality's
fiscal home rule status will be critical to establishing the parameters within which
the municipality can act autonomously.
Further to this point, the authors' case studies indicate the need to address
failing municipal health at least somewhat on a case-by-case basis. In addition to
being shaped by state-level policies, municipalities may also be constrained (or
supported) in their actions by regional authorities, as seen in the city of West
Haven's coordination with regional transit authorities, and by the fiscal stability of
nongovernmental entities, such as schools and stadiums. Taking a holistic view of
the municipality and its position within its region and state will be necessary to
maximize the options for fiscal relief.
The authors' research also illustrates the firm link between union influence and
pension policies. Ten of the cities in the authors' sample had both high unfunded
pension liabilities and high public sector union membership density, and their
analysis of these cities uncovered many instances of union influence on fiscal policy.
Although union politics can be difficult for municipalities to maneuver, the
authors' research nevertheless suggests that a focus on unions will be key to
overcoming fiscal distress. Neither municipal bankruptcy nor state intervention
programs have yet proven consistently effective in addressing union politics or
offering governance reforms. Yet, the authors' research strongly suggests that
recognizing the role politics plays in fiscal decision-making and being cognizant of
the extent to which political decisions are truly reflective of public sentiment is
necessary to devising effective fiscal relief.
To the extent that a municipality is locked into a union contract that no longer
makes economic sense, Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy may provide some
assistance. One of the key benefits of federal bankruptcy is the ability to break
contracts, meaning that Chapter 9, or the threat of it, may be used to help
municipalities reject or renegotiate contracts with influential players such as
unions." Indeed, all four of the cities that filed for bankruptcy in the sample had
high union density. Yet, several of the case studies have indicated that unions
continue to resist changes even once a municipality is in bankruptcy, and the
politics and special interests that may be plaguing cities outside of bankruptcy do
not disappear once the Chapter 9 case is filed. To the extent that the Chapter 9
process can be disentangled from political interests, it is therefore likely to become
a more effective tool for responsibly examining union relationships.

- See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012) (allowing for the assumption, assignment, and rejection of executory
contracts and unexpired leases); Natl Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 516 (1984) (giving
debtors discretion to reject collective bargaining obligations).
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Our analysis also shows that unfunded pension liabilities substantially
contribute to many municipalities' fiscal woes. Although recent Chapter 9
proceedings have indicated that bankruptcy can be used to reduce even
constitutionally protected pension obligations, as with union contracts, a
municipality's ability to cut pensions is likely hampered by state and local politics.
Nevertheless, it is critical to address pensions and their contribution to
municipal fiscal distress because the pension and retiree health care crisis has
ballooned in recent years. Retirees are living longer, and low interest rates have
diminished the returns on pension funds.' To the extent municipalities are
required to meet pension funding obligations, they necessarily have less money each
year to spend on other critical governmental services, such as education, public
safety, park maintenance, and road repairs. The Great Recession further
exacerbated the pension problem by diminishing the value of pension investments.
Although some governments have diverted funds away from paying their share of
pension costs in order to address more pressing concerns, this does not alleviate the
obligation of providing the funding at some point, meaning that governments must
come up with more money in future years to make up any shortfall.
The pension crisis has also become more visible due to new requirements from
the Government Accounting Standards Board ("GASB"), which sets the
accounting standards for the public sector. The GASB now requires municipalities
to include the unfunded actuarial accrued liability of their defined-benefit pension
plans in their annual financial reports. Prior to 2015, public agencies could exclude
these liabilities from their official accounting statements due to a loophole in the
accounting standards. Under the new rules, state and local governments must now
post their "pension liability," or the difference between projected benefits payments
and the assets set aside to cover those payments, dearly on financial statements.3 0
Beginning in 2017, these governments must also begin posting liabilities relating to
retiree health care and "other post employment benefits" (commonly known as
"OPEB") as well. 30 1 By requiring public agencies to fully account for their
unfunded liabilities, the new rules should make the extent of the pension crisis
more transparent and hopefully spur public officials to act to address the problems
in this area.

2 See Richard Dobbs et al., Why InvestorsMay Need to Lower TheirExpectations, MCKINSEY
GLOBAL INST. (Apr. 2016), http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principalinvestors/our-insights/why-investors-may-need-to-lower-their-sights [https://perma.cc/3MSS-BT4M]
(describing repercussions for pensions and other funds due to lowered returns from stocks and bonds).
3 Lisa Lambert & Nanette Byrnes, New Rules May Make Publc Pensions Appear Weaker,
REUTERS (Jun. 25, 2012, 6:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/artide/us-usa-pensions-standards-

idUSBRE8SO01Z20120625 [https-//perma.cc/J249-TNPQ].
301 See generally Accounting and FinancialReporting for Pensions, GOVERNMENTAL ACCT.
STANDARDS BOARD, bttp://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=1176163527868
[bttps-//perma.cc/U32B-SHDX] (last visited Jan. 28, 2017); GASBApproves OtherPost-Employment
Benefits Exposure Drafts, EXPERIENCE BKD (June 2014), http-//www.bkd.com/articles/2014/gasbapproves-other-postemployment-benefits-exposure-drafts.htm [https://perma.cc/3VXZ-YULP].
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Given the prominence of pension struggles, it is perhaps not surprising that five
of the states in the authors' sample-Arizona, Illinois, Louisiana (Appendix),
Michigan, and New York (Appendix)-are among the seven states with
constitutional protections for public pensions.302 Indeed, Arizona, New York, and
Illinois have the strongest public pension protections in the country. Illinois's
protections were recently reinforced when the state's supreme court held in March
2016 that a Chicago law reducing benefits and requiring workers to pay more
toward retirement was unconstitutional. 03 As a result of the decision, Moody's,
which had previously lowered Chicago's bond rating to junk status, threatened
further downgrades? When mandated pension funding and labor pressures create
obligations that city revenues cannot support, fiscal distress is a nearly inevitable
result. Poor financial management may also become more common in these
situations, as public leaders struggle to come up with creative ways to meet or shirk
these increasingly unsustainable obligations. Thus, although the analysis indicates
variance in the forms municipal fiscal distress can take, the common themes of
union presence, pension liabilities, and financial mismanagement play a central
role.
A handful of the cities in the sample turned to bankruptcy to address problems
with pensions and financial mismanagement, but once again, bankruptcy did not
always work well. As evident in Detroit's case, bankruptcy tools do not provide
solutions to underlying problems of governance and fiscal mismanagement.
Furthermore, although some judges have ruled that unsustainable pension
obligations may be modified in bankruptcy,30 s most municipalities, even those in
bankruptcy already, have hesitated to radically reform their pension obligations
using this tool.
If municipalities cannot effectively utilize bankruptcy to address their fiscal
problems, they may turn to state intervention programs to fill the gaps. Yet, the
authors' analysis indicates that the efficacy of state options may also be constrained
by numerous factors, including citizen receptiveness to state involvement, the
state's own fiscal health, and the historical relationship between the state and its
local governments. A state such as Illinois, which struggles considerably with
pension liabilities and financial mismanagement in its own right, may not be a
usefil source of assistance to a city like Chicago, which is experiencing similar
problems on a local level. Other state programs, such as Pennsylvania's Act 47,
have not proven effective at addressing fiscal crises, as cities can stagnate in these
3

Policy,

Stephen D. Eide, ConstitutionalPublic Pension Guarantees: Unfair, Unaffordabk; and Bad
MANHATTAN

INST.

POL'Y

RES.

1

(Aug.

2013),

http://www.manhattan-

institute.org/df/ib_25.pdf [https-//perma.cc/6EWD-MXSW]. Alaska and Hawaii are the other two.
Id.
I Hal Dardick, Ilinois Supreme CourtRulng Forces City to FundNew Fx for 2 Pension Funds,
CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 24, 2016, 6:26 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-chicagopension-law-ruling-0325-20160323-story.html [https://perma.cc/7CGG-NUSA].
3N Id.
' In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 97, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); In re City of
Stockton, Cal., 526 B.R. 35, 62 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015).
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programs for years. While the limitations of municipal bankruptcy have been wellstudied, it is similarly worth acknowledging the limitations of state receiverships
and intervention programs.
Given the shortcomings of both Chapter 9 and various state intervention
programs, the authors' research provides strong evidentiary support for theoretical
arguments that municipal bankruptcy likely works best in combination with a
supportive or complementary state program, rather than in lieu of it." Going
forward, policymakers should design comprehensive relief mechanisms that focus
on the relative strengths of both mechanisms working together, instead of
encouraging the pursuit of one relief mechanism to the exclusion of another.
Finally, although unfunded pension liabilities, union density, and financial
mismanagement emerged as the three most prominent factors contributing to
municipal behavior and distress, the research suggests many other factors worthy of
further study. The authors predict that an examination of the extent to which the
factors they have identified interact in any given municipality will help guide
municipal officials to an appropriate path toward addressing fiscal distress. As an
example, consider Atlantic City, a city below the authors' population threshold, but
one in considerable distress nonetheless. New Jersey's history of providing strong
state oversight for distressed municipalities may suggest that Atlantic City will
attempt to exhaust all state options before considering a bankruptcy filing. Yet, an
analysis of the particular problems Atlantic City is facing with respect to unions,3 0 7
pensions,3 8 and mismanagement. indicates that federal bankruptcy could help the
city avoid some of the concerns officials have expressed about losing autonomy in
the face of a comprehensive state takeover.
In short, there is a critical need to assess and design fiscal relief mechanisms
that harness the strengths of both state and federal programs. Focusing exclusively
on improving either municipal bankruptcy or state intervention will not be nearly as
3 SeeJuliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governancein MunicipalBankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 403 (2014) (discussing chapter 9 bankruptcy's design and the intent that states and the federal
government cooperate to resolve municipal fiscal distress); Laura Napoli Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone
Wrong. Reforing the Chapter 9EZgibilty Rules, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (noting
distinct, complementary roles for state and federal relief in the context of municipal bankruptcy),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=2721876.
3 See, e.g., Jack Tomczuk, Unions1Dt Back at Christieover Executive Order, PRESS ATLANTIc
CITY (Jul. 1, 2016), http-//www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/unions-hit-back-at-christie-over[https://perma.cc/RPG7executive-order/article_6719753a-3fda-11e6-bOOO-e7f67e986cbl.html
ANZZ] (describing union objections after Governor Christie withheld money from Atlantic City and
other parts of New Jersey until cutbacks can be made in public employee spending).
" Patrick McGeehan, Pensions for Lifeguards? Offciah Say Atlantic City Can'tAfford Them
Anymore, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/nyregion/lifeguardpensions-questioned-as-atlantic-citys-finances-falter.html? r=0 [https://perma.cc/6SJT-9RPC] (noting
objections to Atlantic City's payment of approximately $1 million a year for pensions for retired
lifeguards).
' Kate King, Atlantic Citys FinancialProblems Widen, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 12, 2016, 7:10
http://www.ws.con/articles/atlantic-citys-financial-problems-widen-1455322210
PM),
[https://perma.ccfHWX7-BE4X] (discussing the possibility of a state takeover of Atlantic City's
finances).
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effective as designing ways for the two forms of relief to work together. The three
most prevalent factors the authors' research has identified should become the focal
points when broad reforms are designed. In addition to focusing on relief that
could help many municipalities, however, there is a critical need to respond to every
city crisis in a tailored way. Combining the relative uniformity and predictability of
municipal bankruptcy with the more targeted relief a supportive state program
could provide may be the best remedy a distressed municipality could hope for.
No two cities are alike; therefore, no two paths into or out of municipal fiscal
distress will be exactly the same either. For this reason, policymakers designing
relief mechanisms will need to carefully study the effects of the interactions of
various state and federal relief programs to see what is helping and where more
work needs to be done. Although such "fiscal compounding" may require
substantial time and effort, the authors' analysis suggests that such an investment is
necessary to tackle problems that could otherwise overwhelm municipalities. The
framework provided in this Article gives policymakers the tools to engage in exactly
this kind of analysis by identifying the factors most likely to influence municipal
fiscal behavior.
B. Limitations
Although the authors' analysis has sought to be as comprehensive as possible,
like any study, it is subject to limitations. First, by narrowing the survey sample to
cities with populations over 50,000, the authors have necessarily excluded many
cities, including many that have experienced distress. The extent to which smaller
municipalities and other forms of local governments, including counties, towns,
and special districts, have similar or different experiences is therefore less certain.
Additionally, by using bond reports, government analyses, and news articles to
ascertain information about financial mismanagement and triggering events, the
authors incurred the risk that these publicly available resources did not provide a
complete picture of how these factors may have contributed to a municipality's
financial distress. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to determine the intricacies of
"behind the scenes" politics by examining publicly available reports. Finally,
although the authors attempted to account for a wide variety of factors that they
observed in many municipalities, it is of course possible and even likely that other,
unstudied factors are playing a role in municipal distress, a role that the authors
have not been able to document on a larger scale.
These limitations, however, do not diminish the strength of this Article's core
claim: that state and federal relief programs must be used together instead of
separately to address the unique circumstances present in each municipality.
Furthermore, this research has produced a valuable framework that will allow
policymakers to design the necessary comprehensive relief. By evaluating prevalent
predictors of fiscal distress and municipal fiscal behavior, relief can be tailored to
address the particular needs of individual municipalities. Notably, the authors' case
studies demonstrate the strengths and limitations of many of the options currently

2016-2017

Predictors of Municipal Bankruptcies and State Intervention

547

available to municipalities, suggesting that these options should be utilized in a
targeted fashion for municipalities experiencing fiscal distress. Although no onesize-fits-all solution for resolving municipal fiscal crises exists, this Article has
nevertheless successfully identified key areas of focus common to most
municipalities.
CONCLUSION

This Article pinpoints specific economic, political, and legal factors
contributing to municipal fiscal distress and illustrates how many of these factors
are not adequately addressed by existing state and federal relief mechanisms. It
therefore provides a jumping-off point for further empirical research into the
connections among the factors and the roles they play in specific municipalities.
Furthermore, using the factors and case studies this Article provides, scholars and
policymakers should design relief mechanisms that allow state programs to work in
conjunction with municipal bankruptcy, in order to address the varied sources of
municipal distress more comprehensively. The factors and case studies identified
here should serve as a framework to help policymakers craft targeted, focused
solutions for the myriad ways fiscal problems can manifest in U.S. municipalities.
APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL CASE STUDIES

Additional case studies for the remaining cities are provided here. To the extent
that the authors have not previously discussed the state backdrop for each
remaining municipality, the authors do so briefly at the beginning of the relevant
case study.
A. New Bitain, Connecticu t o
New Britain, Connecticut's seventh largest municipality, is known as the
"Hardware City" due to its rich manufacturing history, and the city retains a strong
manufacturing base today."' New Britain has never defaulted on the payment of
principal or interest on its bonds or notes;312 however, in 2014, both S&P and
Moody's downgraded the city's rating, citing concerns over its budget.3 1 1 Some
310 Population: 73,122; incorporated 1870; annual budget: $224 million. Erin E. Stewart, Investing

2015),
16,
(Apr.
NEWBRITAINCT.GOV
Tomorrow,
Stronger
in
a
http*//www.newbritainct.gov/index.php/119-government/mayoroffice/budget-proposal/388-newbritain-s-2016-budget-f.html.
311 CITY OF NEW BRITAIN, CONNECTICUT, $29,000,000 GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, 2015
https-//s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/munihub/wp17
(2015),
at
A,
SERIES
content/uploads/354_354_OS_FINAL.pdf [bttps*//perma.cc/B9X3-AE3S].
312 Id. at 6, 12, A-9
313 Don Stacom, After A Fall, New Britain's Bond Rating Gets a Boost, HARTFORD COURANT
(Jan. 21, 2015, 10:05 PM), http://www.courant.com/community/new-britain/hc-new-britain-bonds0127-20150121-story.html [https://perma.cc/U6QC-9VVRR] [hereinafter Stacom, AflerA Fall.
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observers, including the city's former mayor, pinned this budgetary stress on union
troubles, noting that the unions had often refused to give concessions."' In 2012,
the unions called for a forensic audit of the city's books.31s In 2015, S&P reversed
course, upgrading the city's bond rating after Mayor Erin Stewart raised taxes by
11% and made additional spending cuts to rein in the city's finances."' Moody's,
however, has not raised its rating."'
New Britain's pensions are relatively well-funded, with the firemen's fund and
the policemen's fund funded at 89.2% and 82.1%, respectively.3 1 s In recent years,
the city has undertaken several economic development initiatives aimed at
diversifying its tax base and shedding its image as a worn-down industrial city.
Nevertheless, S&P has observed that New Britain's economy is weak and needs
further development. 9 Thanks to significant local authority to raise taxes and cut
spending, however, New Britain has not needed state assistance to resolve its
financial difficulties.
3 20
B. Harnmond, Indiand

Indiana has a state intervention program for its distressed municipalities, which
allows for a receiver or other financial manager to supervise the entity in distress
and restructure labor finances, request emergency funding, and provide the
municipality with technical assistance.321 Indiana also seeks to be proactive in
preventing municipal distress. The state constitution limits municipal debt levels to
2% of the value of taxable property within the area.2 This limitation is subject to

31

4 Don Stacom, New Britain Unions: 7t's Time to Audit the Books,'HARTFORD COURANT (Apr.
18,
2012),
http://artides.courant.com/2012-04-18/community/hc-new-britain-labor-041820120417_1_independent-audit-new-britain-unions-three-municipal-unions
[https//perma.cc/887TELKD].
3

1

316

Id
Stacom, AfirA Fall, supra note 313.

37Id.
31

RurE

PINHo, MUNICIPAL PENSION OBLIGATIONS, CONN. GEN. ASSEMB., RES. REP. 2015-

R-0249, at 3 (2015), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2015/rpt/pdf/2015-R-0249.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKH2-

SK3YJ.
319 See Paul Burton, "Youthful Mayor Steers New Britain Turnaround" (Bond Buyer),
STEWARTFORNB.COM (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.stewartfornb.com/youthful-mayor-steers-newbritain-turnaround-bond-buyer/ [https-//perma.cc/CC2H-2F8E].
" Population 78,384; incorporated 1884; annual budget: $131 million. Chelsea Schneider Kirk,
Hammond City Council
Weighs 2014 Budget, NWI.COM
(Sept.
21,
2013),
http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/hammond/hammond-city-council-weighsbudget/article_fdf37f38-89a0-5abc-a9be-f51455611438.html
[httpsl//perma.cc/4UT6-2ARWI
(indicating
budget);
Hammond,
Indiana,
CITY-DATA.COM,
http-//www.citydata.com/city/Hammond-Indiana.html [https-//perma.cc/3CEW-JCGLI (last visited Jan. 29, 2017)
(indicating population and incorporation date).
321 The State Role in Local Government 17nancialDistress, supra note 23, at 6.
- Frost, supra note 19, at 849 n.170.
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override by petition from a majority of property owners in cases where excess debt
is necessary for public protection and defense. 32
Indiana's Home Rule Act of 1980 allows for municipal home rule; however, the
Act also subjects municipalities to numerous prohibitions, such that the exceptions
may swallow the rule. 32 4 Indiana local governments may not impose taxes, licenses,
or fees, nor may they invest money without an affirmative vote from the state
legislature.32 5 Indiana home rule governments are also subject to strict property tax
limits, and all Indiana municipal budgets must be approved by the relevant
county.32
3 27
The
In 2014, S&P lowered Hammond's issuer credit rating to BBB+.
the
city's
in
imbalance
structural
prolonged
of
consequence
was
a
downgrade
operating funds, which have constricted the city's budgetary flexibility. 31 City
management has primarily relied on gaming fund revenues and has been seeking to
issue bonds to fill the budget gap.3a S&P's outlook was stable, reflecting its
expectation that Hammond's structural imbalance will continue during the next
two years. 3 30
Hammond has an overall weak budgetary performance, with a deficit of 17.8%
for the general fund and 10.5% for total funds as of 2013.331 At least one
councilman has suggested that bankruptcy could be in the city's near future;
however, the city controller has begun taking steps to help reduce long-term
332
expenses, including combining departments to save money.
Hammond is yet another example of a city where local officials have substantial
autonomy to structure finances and spending. This autonomy can, however, work
in two ways, and as seen in Hammond, local officials may take advantage of their
relative flexibility to both create fiscal distress and alleviate it.

323 Id.

324 See Stone, supra note 88, at 2.
3 25
Id.
326Id.

m Elizabeth Campbell, Fading Casino Revenue Has Indiana Town Seffng Debt: Muni Credit,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2014, 8:00 PM), http-//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-1022/fading-casino-revenue-has-indiana-town-selling-debt-muni-credit [https://perma.cc/4UVX-5S3U].
328Id
329I.
33

Id.
331 Ed Bierscbenk, Despite Red Ink Criticism, Hammond Defends Bond Sale, NWI.COM (Mar.
http-//www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/despite-red-ink-criticism-hammond-defends10, 2015),

bond-sale/articelec60fe8-flOb-5b56-9460-91fae75812a.html [https://perma.cc/V8T5-VVTA].
332 Id

KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL

550

Vol. log

C. New Orleans, Louisiana..
Louisiana does not have a formal state intervention program for its
municipalities; it does, however, allow its distressed municipalities to file for
bankruptcy.3 1 In order to file, the municipality must receive approval from the
state's elected Bond Commission."s In addition, the municipality must acquire
written approval from the governor and attorney general prior to filing.33 6
Louisiana has a specific clause in its constitution that protects public employee
pensions.337 Despite this protection, recent estimates suggest that Louisiana has
nearly $16.6 billion in pension liabilities, representing $3,570 for every person in
the state.3
New Orleans is Louisiana's largest city by population. It has a home rule form
of government run by a mayor and a city council.339 New Orleans' home rule
charter allows the city council to levy all classes of taxes, excises, licenses, liens, and
fees necessary to operate the municipality, to pay debt, and to make capital
improvements.3 O Property taxes are subject to voter approval." The City Council
may also borrow money, subject to a cap of 75% of the amount of that year's
uncollected taxes.342
New Orleans has four separate pension systems but has experienced some
difficulty funding them. In FY 2011, for example, New Orleans made no
contributions to its post-employment benefits plan. 3 Although environmental
events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Isaac, and the Deepwater Horizon spill,
have had negative repercussions on New Orleans' finances and population, the city
has shown signs of economic recovery. 4 As of March 2015, the city's credit risk
was better than it was before Katrina, thanks in part to a ratings bump from

' Population 384,320; founded 1718; annual budget: $601 million. See CITY OF NEw ORLEANS,

2016

ANNUAL

OPERATING

BUDGET

17,

18,

34

(2015),

http://www.nola.gov/mayor/budget/documents/2016-adopted-budget-book-file/

[https://perma.cc/KF99-22HY].
" The State Role in Local Government FinancialDistress, supra note 23, at 6.
33s Lauren M. Wolfe, The Next Financial Hurricane? Rethinking Municipal Bankruptcy in

Louisiana, 72 LA. L. REv. 555, 556 (2012).
36 Frost, supra note 19, at 839.
3 Eide, supra note 302, at 1, 2 (citing LA. CONST. art. X, § 29, d. A, B).
' Robert McClendon, Louisiana's $16 Billion Retirement Liabilities Mostly 'Hidden,' Report

Says,

TIMES-PICAYUNE

(Mar.

27,

2015,

8-54

AM),

http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/03/louisianaunfundedretirement.html

[https://perma.cc/R9WU-D2NS].
33

1 NEW ORLEANS, LA., CODE art. I, § 1-102 (2014).

3341 Se id. art. III, § 3-101(2).
Id.
342 Id. art. III, § 3-121.
3 CITY OF NEw ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, $195,885,000 TAXABLE LIMITED TAX REFUNDING
BONDS,
SERIES
2012,
OFFICIAL
STATEMENT
27
(2012),
http://emma.msrb.org/IssueView/lssueDetails.aspx?id=EA343534 [https://perma.cc/738T-UG2C].
I See id at 35-38.
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S&P.'s Still, pension costs in New Orleans are chipping away at the city's budget,
and officials have faced pressure to make changes, such as raising the retirement
age and increasing employee contributions.3 6
After Katrina, New Orleans moved to an all-charter school system, meaning
that the city has nearly no teachers unions." Nevertheless, New Orleans has
publicly struggled with its firefighters over control of their pension fund, and in
2015 the state Supreme Court ruled that the city's finance director could sue
pension board members for financial mismanagement.W The mayor has also
pushed for city control of the fund.'
In 2014, former New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin, who was in office from 2002
to 2010, was convicted on twenty counts of bribery, fraud, and money
laundering."' Officials claimed that Nagin took $500,000 in under-the-table
money in exchange for awarding millions of dollars of city contracts to several
contractors and that he had received over $200,000 in bribes. 31
New Orleans has not demonstrated a need to file for municipal bankruptcy,
though it has received external aid to recover from unforeseeable, devastating
events. Although the destruction and displacement caused by natural disasters in
the area created a fiscal crisis for the city, which relied on sales and property tax
revenues to provide services and repair damaged infrastructure, New Orleans has
been able to stage a recovery in the years since the hurricanes. 352 If officials continue
to disregard pension underfumding, however, the city may find that its struggles are
far from over.

3

Robert McClendon, New Orleans' Credit Rating Swpasses Pre-Katrina Level as Local

Economy

Improves,

TIMES-PICAYUNE

(Mar.

10,

2015,

9:10

PM),

http-//www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/03/neworleans.html [https://perma.cc/ZDD9-PH4Y].
3 6
4 Robert McClendon, Amid Rising Costs, New OrleansEmployee Pension Fund Under Pressure
to
Trim
Bencts,
TIMES-PICAYUNE
(Feb.
2,
2015,
9:56
AM),
http//www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/02/amid-rising-costs-new orleans.htmi
[https://perma.cc/3YFX-WE7G].
" Colleen Kimmett, 10 Years Aflier Katrina,New Orleans'All-CharterSchool System Has Proven
a Failure, IN THESE TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015), http://inthesetimes.com/artidce/18352/10-years-afterkatrina-new-orleans-all-charter-district-has-proven-a-failur [https://perma.cc/AFF3-SNSM].
" Richard Rainey, New OrleansEnance Director Can Sue Over FirefightersPension Losses, La.
4:14
PM),
2015,
13,
(Feb.
TIMES-PICAYUNE
Rules,
Court
Supreme
http-//www.nola.com/politics/index.ssfl2015/02/new-orleansfimance-directorc.html
[https://perma.cc/7GYV-P7TL].
3 Id.
"0Jeffrey Young, Ex-New Orleans Mayor Starts Long jail Term for Corruption, VOICE AM.
(Sept. 15, 2014, 6:28 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/ex-new-orleans-mayor-starts-long-jailterm-for-corruption-convictions/2449928.html [https.//perma.cc/7K9P-JHQV].
351 Id.

352 See THE BUREAU OF GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH & THE PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH
3
(2006),
1,
PERSPECTIVE
IN
BANKRUPTCY
LA.,
MUNICIPAL
OF
COUNCIL

bttp://parlouisiana.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Municipal-Bankruptcy-in-Perspective-April2006-l.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4KK-KUZP].
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D. Baltimore, Marylands3
Maryland has no formal state intervention mechanism, nor does it allow its
municipalities to file for bankruptcy.s' The primary source of municipal
intergovernmental aid in the state stems from the array of aid distribution and
revenue sharing programs the state has with its counties, municipalities, and
Baltimore City. The state's FY 2017 budget includes approximately $6.5 billion in
direct aid to local governments. 3ss Maryland also takes preventative measures with
respect to its municipalities, requiring any local government authorized to incur
debt to file a detailed financial report annually with the State Treasurer. 3s6
Baltimore is governed by an elected mayor, a comptroller, and a city council.3 s7
The city has a home rule charter, which the Maryland Constitution grants
Baltimore the power to amend.ss Per the charter, Baltimore can issue general
obligation debt, and the state General Assembly may not enact local laws for the
city if the charter has granted the city jurisdiction in a particular area.3 5
In 2013, Baltimore commissioned a ten-year financial forecast from Public
Financial Management, Inc. The forecast showed that the city's government was
headed toward financial ruin and predicted that the city would accumulate $745
million in budget deficits over the next decade due to a widening gap between
projected recurring revenues and expenditures. 60 Including infrastructure needs
and liabilities for retiree health care benefits, the total shortfall was predicted to
reach $2 billion over ten years, despite city officials' previous efforts to dose budget
gaps. 36
Baltimore has long suffered demographic challenges, including a roughly 36%
population decline since 1980.362 At least one report attributes this problem to the
Open Budget Baltimore, CITY BALTIMORE, http-//openbudget.baltimorecity.gov/#/
[https://perma.cc/R84Q-UNDS] (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
" The State Role in Local Government FinancialDistress, supra note 23, at 6.
3ss

State

Aid

to

Local

Governments,

MD.

DEP'T.

http://ds.state.md.us/Content.aspx?page=658 [https://perma.cc/MF9G-MESKI
2017).
3 Frost, supra note 19, at 31-32 n.185.

LEGIS.

SERVS.,

(last visited Jan. 30,

357 MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE (CrIY OF BALTIMORE, MARYLAND)
CONSOLIDATED SPECIAL OBLIGATION REIJNDING BONDS (TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
PROJECTS) $20,195,000 SERIES 2015, at 7, https-//emma.msrb.org/ER886793-ER692774-

ER1094369.pdf[https//perma.cc/LR7U-QF2D].
31 MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 5.
3'
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MARSHALL

L.

LIBR.
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https-//www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/researchguides/tmiguide/chapter9.pdf
[https-//perma.cc/UF6D-FDQXI (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
"o Associated Press, City of Baltimore is on a Path to FinancialRuin, Report Says, FOX NEWS
POL. (Feb. 6, 2013), http-//wwwloxnews.com/politics/2013/02/06/city-baltimore-is-on-path-tofinancial-ruin-report-says.html [httpsl//perma.cc/8MVS-RVP3].
361Id.
362 Richard A. Epstein, Baltimore's Real Police Problem: tUions, FEDERALIST (May 12, 2015),
http://thefederalist.com/2015/05/12/baltimores-real-police-problem-unions/ [https://perma.cc/J2W53WFZ].
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city's labor and taxation policies, the former of which have historically been unionfriendly." Problems with the city's school district may also be contributing to the
population drain. A 2012 audit of the school system indicated lapses in financial
management, particularly with respect to managing overtime and other contractual
matters.36

Although Baltimore has been fully funding its annual required pension
contributions, its pension burden is still quite high, amounting to $3.8 billion, or
about 2.33 times its operating revenues.3 65 Thus, Baltimore represents a city on the
edge, which could tumble into insolvency if it hits a "tipping point." Proactive
monitoring by both the state of Maryland and the city itself to ensure continued
adequate funding of pension obligations may help Baltimore prevent its problems
from becoming unmanageable in the future.
E. North Las Vegas, Nevada
Nevada does not authorize its municipalities to file for bankruptcy, but it does
have a state intervention program coordinated by the state's Department of
Taxation.16 7 After weighing twenty-seven conditions to determine whether a local
government is in "severe financial emergency," the Department may appoint a
manager to negotiate and approve collective bargaining agreements for the
locality." Nevada law also permits the manager to dis-incorporate or dissolve a
distressed city.36' The Department of Taxation may undertake this inquiry on its
own or at a municipality's request. Regardless of how the process begins, both the
Department and the Nevada Tax Commission play key roles in determining the
facts surrounding a municipality's distress and in providing expertise regarding the
municipality's available options. 370
Prior to 2015, Nevada functioned under Dillon's Rule, which says that the state
exercises control over the powers that are granted to local jurisdictions.3 7' However,
f See id.

Erica L. Green & Luke Broadwater, Mayor Calls on Alonso, School Board to Fix Broken
Financial Management, BALT. SUN (Oct. 11, 2012), http-//artides.baltimoresun.com/2012-1011/news/bal-mayor-calls-on-alonso-school-board-to-fix-broken-flnancial-management20121010 1 alonso-school-board-school-construction [https*//perma.cc/3KQD-XLMY].
3
Carrie Sheffield, Baltimore Paradox: City Finances Strong, Anti-Poverty Policies Weak,
FORBES (May 1, 2015, 9:43 AM), http-//www.forbes.com/sites/carriesheffield/2015/05/01/baltimoreparadox-city-finances-strong-anti-poverty-policies-weak/ [https://perma.cc/RV8M-J44X].
3

6

CITY

OF

NORTH

LAS

VEGAS,

ADOPTED

BUDGET

2015-2016

(2015),

http://www.cityofnorthlasvegas.com/docs/Finance/BudgetBooks/CompleteBudgetBook_20152016_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QVJ-68ES].
7
SeeNEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354.685 (West 2015).
3
The State Role in Local Government FnancialDistress, supra note 23, at 8.
m Id. at 19.
370 Frost, supra note 19, at 45.
371 Local Government Authority, NAT'L LEAGUE CITIES, http-//www.nlc.org/build-skills-andnetworks/resources/cities-101/city-powers/local-government-authority [https*//perma.cc/9YSN-5U9K]
(last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
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Nevada recently passed a home rule statute. Despite this change, Nevada's home
rule statute does not provide fiscal home rule authority to local governments. Under
the statute, home rule entities may not impose a tax without the Legislature's
approval, and no new taxing powers are provided to local jurisdictions.372
North Las Vegas has few of the attractions of neighboring Las Vegas. The city
has several small casinos and hotels but primarily functions as a bedroom
community serving the larger employment center of Las Vegas. 3 The population
in North Las Vegas is generally younger and less affluent than its neighboring city,
and buying income declined sharply during the great recession relative to the
surrounding area. 374 This resulted in the city losing both sales and property tax
revenue and led to a pension crisis.375 Although the city eventually negotiated
settlements with its police and fire unions, Moody's, S&P, and Fitch all
downgraded it in 2011.376

The lack of a significant commercial sector, coupled with years of
mismanagement by city officials that included overly generous pay and benefit
packages for municipal workers and expensive, questionable capital projects such as
a new city hall and a new water treatment facility, likely contributed to the city's
vulnerable financial situation. 7 7 The city's incoming chief financial manager noted
in 2014 that city officials had engaged in a number of poor financial practices,

including "hiding the facts from policymakers, concealing rates in financial models,
taxing without properly informing ratepayers and dishonestly representing [the
city's] financial condition. " 7

Nevertheless, employment prospects have somewhat brightened for North Las
Vegas. Both Tesla Motors and Farraday Future have begun constructing plants in
the area, and regional planners are seeking to leverage this opportunity to designate

an Sandra Chereb, Lawmakers Talk "Home Rule" for Jurisdictions,LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Feb. 9,
2015, 1:11 PM), http-//www.reviewjournal.com/news/nevada-legislature/lawmakers-talk-home-rulejurisdictions [https//perma.cc/R9VF-LGD3].
3 See Derek Prall, MunicipalLeader of the Year: GoingAll In, AM. CITY & COUNTY (Oct. 28,
2016),
http//americancityandcounty.com/economic-development/municipal-leader-year-going-aUl
[https//perma.cc/RHY2-TEKX].
374 CITY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, $27,070,000, GENERAL OBLIGATION (LIMITED
TAX) REFUNDING BONDS, SERIES 2011, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, 19, 36-37, 56 (Oct. 19, 2011),

emma.msrb.org/ER514697-ER398930-ER800512.pdf
[https-//perma.cc/776P-PA3F].
375

Id.

Id. at 69-69.
m Robert E. Lang, A High Stakes Gamble in North Las Vegas, LINCY INST., May 2012, at 2-3,
httpsd/www.unlv.edu/sites/default/files/24/Brief-High-Stakes-Gamble-April2Ol2.pdf
[https//perma.cc/3HRP-FHAP].
m Andrew Doughman, North Las Vegas Ofcials Paint Grim Picture of City's inances, LAS
VEGAS SUN (Jan. 8, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://1asvegassun.com/news/2014/jan/08/north-las-vegasofficials-paint-grim-picture-citys/ [httpsi/perma.cc/8Q26-B6GP] (quoting North Las Vegas Mayor
John Lee).
376
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the area as a hub for electric car manufacturing.379 Regional planners are seeking
additional partnerships with private corporations to achieve this result.
North Las Vegas is a city that has taken advantage of the state's intervention
mechanisms and, using state resources in combination with changes to local
governance practices and infrastructure development, seems to be creating new
hope for its fiscal future.
F Jersey City, NewJerse/"
Jersey City is New Jersey's second-largest municipality."' The city's history has
been characterized by political corruption, crime, financial mismanagement and
industrial pollution, but in recent years, it has begun to gentrify.382 Although Jersey
City historically faced some economic difficulties, its financial condition also has
improved in recent years due to balanced operations and strong prospects for
continued tax base growth. The 2013 calendar year resulted in an excess of
$12,410,182 in operations.38 Jersey City restructured its debt in early 2006." This
restructuring provided millions of dollars of debt service relief in FY 2006 and in
several future years.ass
In November 2014, Moody's upgraded Jersey City's bond rating to Al, citing
the city's large tax base and rising income levels." Jersey City's financial health has
improved significantly since facing a gap of $51.4 million in 2009 in their structural
budget." The gap has since been reduced to approximately $16 million as of
2014." Jersey City has the highest municipal tax base in the state."
7 Megan Messerly & Daniel Rothberg, Hyperloop Test Track to Come to North Las Vegas, LAS
VEGAS SUN (Dec. 8, 2015, 9:15 AM), http/asvegassun.com/news/2015/dec/08/hyperloop-test-trackto-come-to-north-las-vegas/ [https://perma.cc/HT2L-V436].
3o See Terrence T. McDonald, 10 Thngs You Should Know About This Year's Jersey City
Budget,
NJ.COM
(Mar.
1,
2016,
2:59
PM),
http//www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2016/03/10_things-you-should-knowaboutthis-years jersey.ht
ml [https-//perma.cc/283G-JX9F ].
The List: The Top 10 Multilngual Municipalties in New Jersey,
3s1 Meir Rinde,
NJSPOTLIGHT.COM (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/15/04/26/the-list-the-top10-multilingual-municipatities-in-new-jersey/ [https//perma.cc/A2GB-JSHG].
3
2 Associated Press, Jersey City, NorthernNewJersey, An Example ofGentrilcationGoing on in
Communities Nationwide, LEHIGH VALLEY LIVE (Apr. 15, 2013, 5:30 AM),
http://wwwlehighvalleylive.com/breakingnews/index.ssf/2013/04/jersey-cty-northern-new jerse.html [https-//perma.cc/3FBQ-Z8TA].
31

CITY OF JERSEY CITY IN THE COUNTY OF HUDSON, STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICIAL

STATEMENT 13 (Nov. 20, 2014), httpi/emma.msrb.org/EA670384-EA525110-EA921306.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6RNV-LDPW].
3
1d. at 14.
' Terrence T. McDonald, Moody's UpgradesJersey CityBond Rating, Citing RisingIncome
Levels,'NJ.COM (Nov. 13, 2014,5:00 PM),
http-//www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2014/11/moodys-upgrades-jersey-citybondrating-citing-rising
income levels.html [https//permacc/D94-CV6B].
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Jersey City was able to avoid municipal bankruptcy or a state takeover by
effectuating its own consensual debt restructuring in the mid-2000s. The city's
proximity to New York City has allowed it to develop a large tax base, which the
city should be able to leverage to further improve its economic condition.

G. NiagaraFalls" and Utica,3 91 New York
New York has in the past intervened in the affairs of its distressed
municipalities; however, the level of intervention depends on the severity of the
emergency, and New York officials have demonstrated a preference for proactive
monitoring of local government finances instead of provision of direct aid.3 9 2 New
York's monitoring system requires cities and school districts to send financial data
to the state comptroller throughout the year.393 The comptroller then scores the
entities in terms of their distress levels. 39 4 If a city is shown to be experiencing
distress, the comptroller's office can offer technical assistance, including budgeting
and long-term planning services, to the distressed city.3 9s
In terms of actual intervention, state lawmakers have twice set up corporations
to sell bonds for cities in distress: once in New York City in 1975, and once in the
city of Troy in 1995.96 Yet, New York largely eschews standardized intervention
programs, preferring instead to give lawmakers the freedom to prescribe different
roles and powers for financial control boards and other ways to respond directly to
specific instances of city distress.9 Once a financial control board or emergency
manager is appointed, that authority can recommend that the local government be
authorized to file for municipal bankruptcy.3 98
New York's constitution explicitly protects public employee pensions, including
future pension accruals. 3 9 This essentially confers constitutional protection on
3

Id.
" Population 49,468; incorporated 1892; annual budget: $95 million. NiagaraFalls, New York,
ALCHETRON, https://alchetron.com/Niagara-Falls,-New-York-11447-W [https-//perma.cc/AW7KZ2U7] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) (indicating population and founding year);CrrY OF NIAGARA FALLS,
2014 ADOPTED BUDGET,

httpf//www.egovlink.com/public-documents300/niagarafalls/published documents/Administration/Ad
opted%20Budget%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZSZ-ZX6Q] (indicating budget).
391 Population 62,235; incorporated 1832; annual budget: $68.4 million. Utica, New York,
OICSGROUP.ORG,
http-//research.omicsgroup.org/index.php/Utica,_NewYork
[https-//perma.cc/M5LH-4KP2] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) (indicating population and founding year);
CITY OF UTICA, NEW YORK, 2015-16 COUNCIL AMENDED FINAL BUDGET (Mar. 16, 2016),

http://www.cityofutica.com/Assets/Departments/Budget/City-Budget/2016-2017%20Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R95W-YEP5] (indicating budget).
`
The State Role in Local Government FinancialDistress, supra note 23, at 4.

mId. at 20.

394Id

3

95Id.

"' Id. at 16.
39

Id. at 21-22.

" Gillette & Skeel, supra note 8, at 1220.
' Eide, supra note 302.
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compensation for as-yet unperformed work, making New York's protections
among the strongest in the country."
New York has also granted constitutional home rule powers to all counties
outside of New York City, and to all cities, towns, and villages." New York's
Municipal Home Rule Law provides home rule entities with the power to collect
local taxes authorized by the State Legislature, as well as assessments for local
improvements.4 2 Nevertheless, courts have long construed matters of taxation and
indebtedness as matters of "state concern" that may not be managed by home rule
entities. 3 All local laws relating to debt, taxes, and assessments must thus be
consistent with laws enacted by the State Legislature.4
The city of Niagara Falls is in western New York State, near the famous
landmark of the same name. Niagara Falls is an old industrial city that has declined
significantly over the years: since 2000 the city's population has been reduced by 9%
and the number of city residents living in poverty has grown by 2%."0s
The poverty and population loss Niagara Falls is experiencing can be attributed
to the decline of the city's major industry. Newer technology has surpassed the
generating power of Niagara's own plant, and the last major business in the area, a
casino operated by the Seneca Nation, opened in 2002.' Although the casino
generated revenue, legal battles over the revenue sharing program impeded the
city's ability to reap the benefits of that revenue for many years." In June 2013,
New York State and the Seneca Nation reached a landmark agreement that
resolved the long-running dispute. Under this agreement, Niagara Falls received a
25% share of (pro-rated) local impact payments from the casino, which amounted
to $89 million, as well as a say in future revenue-sharing percentages."
Despite this recent reversal in fortune, Niagara Falls's continued struggle with
poverty and population loss has in essence forced the city to focus on reactive
4W
401

See id

Adopting

Local

Laws

in

New

York

State,

N.Y.

DEP'T

ST.

1

(2015),

https-//www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/AdoptingLocalLawsinNewYorkState.pdf

[https://perma.cc/YC5E-BZT5].
4 Id. at 2.
4 Id. at 6-10.
4 Id. at 4.
41 Justin Sondel, Poverty in Niagara: 'Culture of Poverty' Impacting Significant Number of
http://www.niagara(Mar.
2,
2014),
GAZETTE
Residents in the Falls, NIAGARA
gazette.com/news/local-news/poverty-in-niagara-culture-of-poverty-impacting-significant-number-

oflartie dl437341-9708-5256-8105-b8c983142e36.html[https-//perma.cc/T2ZQ-9XMR].
4
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, OFFICIAL STATEMENT SUPPLEMENT, $7,437,000 GENERAL
OBLIGATION (SERIAL) BONDS, 2011, at A-2, A-19, (2011), http://emma.msrb.org/EP572766-

EP449455-EP849390.pdf [https*//perma.cc/BM8Z-AA4U] [hereinafter CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS,
OFFICIAL STATEMENT SUPPLEMENT].
0

See Dave McKinley, Fix the Fals: CasinoImpact, WGRZ (Jul. 24,2015, 1055 AM),

http-//legacy.wgrz.com/story/news/2015/07/22/after-more-than-a-dozen-years-has-the-gamble-paid-

off/30515961/ [https*//perma.cc/6F9W-AZ7V].
0 CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, NIAGARA COUNTY, NEW YORK $7,920,000 REFUNDING (SERIAL)
BONDS 2014, OFFICIAL STATEMENT, at A-3, A-4 (2014), http://emma.msrb.org/ER788884-

EA488484-EA884987.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD3G-228W1.
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problem solving rather than proactive future planning and development.' City
officials hope that more reliable casino revenue, along with a recently developed
plan to link the downtown area with the waterfront, will benefit the city.410 These
developments contributed to decisions from Moody's and S&P to raise their ratings
outlook from "negative" to "stable."41
Niagara Falls demonstrates some of the difficulties cities face when dealing with
long-term problems like poverty and population loss caused by industry decline.
Although the city has struggled in the past, recent state-level legal successes have
given it the money it needs to begin engaging in needed infrastructure
improvements to reverse the problems it has long faced.
Like Niagara Falls, the city of Utica was once an industrial powerhouse.
Located in upstate New York along the Erie Canal, the city was an ideal location
for the manufacture and transport of goods for sale.4 1 Now, however, the city's
population has dwindled and the prominence of its location diminished as rail
transit and interstate trucking have replaced the Canal as the predominant method
of moving goods and supplies.413 Little industry remains in Utica itself to employ
citizens.414 Utica has also struggled with aging infrastructure, high poverty levels,
economic disinvestment, changing demographics, and a lack of long-range
planning.4 15
Recently, Utica has been at the forefront of a regional movement seeking to
develop the area as a destination for culture, arts, and outdoor activity. An influx of
foreign refugees over the past few decades has brought challenges and benefits to
the city.4 16 Utica has sought to harness the distinct cultures of the Burmese,
Sudanese, and Bosnian members of its population and distinguish itself as a

Mike Hudson, Poverty Industry Provides Growth Sector for Stiruggng Falls Economy,
FALLS
REP.
(Dec.
17,
2015),
http-//niagarafallsreporter.com/Stories/2015/DEC17/Povertylndustry.html
[https//perma.cc/CG9JMZNK].
410
Mark Belcher, City Plans to Remove RobertMoses Parkway, WIVB (Feb. 19, 2015, 7:22 PM),
http://wivb.com/2015/02/19/city-plans-to-remove-robert-moses-parkway/
[https-//perma.cc/LL3F5PVL].
4

NIAGARA

411 CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, OFFICIAL STATEMENT SUPPLEMENT, supra note 406; CITY OF
NIAGARA FALLS, NIAGARA CoUNIY, NEW YORK $7,920,000 REFUNDING (SERIAL) BONDS 2014,
OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 408, at 5.
412
R2G Utica, Utica: Yesterday and Today, RUST 2 GREEN, http://www.rust2green.org/utica.php
[https://perma.cc/F7TJ-DRT3] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
413
Id.
414 Id.
415Id

41

Jennifer S. Vey, RestoringProsperity: The State Role in RevitalzingAmerica's Older Industrial
Cities,
BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
METROPOLITAN
POL'Y
PROGRAM
(2007),
http://www.achp.gov/docs/RestoringProsperityBrookingsInstitutionreport.pdf

[https-//perma.cc/45ND-T46H].
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multicultural activity hub. 417 The arrival of refugees has also brought the assistance
of non-profits to the region, which helps with job placement and other projects. 4 18
The benefits of regional coordination in Utica are reflected in the jobs that have
been created and in the ratings upgrades the city has received in recent years. In
2014, Moody's and S&P gave Utica a "stable" rating, and both agencies upgraded
their outlooks to "positive" in 2015.419
Utica has rebounded well from previous financial mismanagement. A 2013
fiscal profile paints a bleak picture of a city with almost no money in any fund
balance, a low credit rating, and few overall options.420 The mayor's 2016-2017
budget emphasized that previous administrations spent the capital improvement
fund to make up budget shortfalls, a practice that, while not illegal, drained the
city's reserves and left Utica with "nothing to show for it."42 1 Using regional
coordination mechanisms, however, Utica has begun to experience a turnaround
that may benefit the city for years to come.
H Providence, Rhode Island`
Rhode Island has become substantially involved with its distressed
municipalities in the past, most notably in the aftermath of Central Falls' 2011
bankruptcy filing. In the wake of that filing, state officials appointed a receiver to
monitor the city's actions, and legislators passed a law designed to protect the city's
bond investors from taking a hit.4 2 More generally, Rhode Island law allows
receivers to negotiate new union contracts, approve or issue debt, and supervise
municipal finances. 424 In addition, Rhode Island can bail out financially distressed
417 E.g., Susan Hartman, A NewLife for Refugees, and the CitytheyAdopted, N.Y. Times (Aug.
10, 2014), bttps-//www.nytimes.com/2014/08/11/nyregion/a-new-life-for-refugees-and-the-city-theyadopted.html [https-//perma.cc/HH6C-Q6KS]; Amelia Rawlins, Somal Bantu Offce Opens for
Business, UTICAO (Apr. 30, 2010, 12:01 AM), http-//www.uticaod.com/x938980327/Somali-Bantuoffice-opens-for-business [https-//perma.cc/9QVT-HSB4].
418 Hartman, supra note 417.
411 CITY OF UTICA, ONEIDA COUNIY, NEW YORK, $2,424,000 PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT (SERIAL)
BONDS, OFFICIAL STATEMENT (2014), emma.msrb.org/EA630404-EA493270-EA889719.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Y4C-3T7A]; CITY OF UTICA, ONEIDA COUNTY, NEWYORK, $3,887,600 PUBLIC
IMPROVEMENT (SERIAL) BONDS, OFFICIAL STATEMENT (2015), emma.msrb.org/ER870972ER680535-ER1082260.pdf [https://perma.ccIK6L9-YWJ7].
42
THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, 2013 FISCAL PROFILE: CITY OF UTICA (2013),
https*//www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/fiscalprofiles/utica.pdf [httpsi//perma.cc/P6QB-8ELB].
12
(2016),
PROPOSED
BUDGET:
FY
2016-2017,
421
MAYOR'S
http-//www.cityofutica.com/Assets/Departments/Mayor/PDFDocuments/Mayor's%20Budget%20Message%20'16-'17.pdf [https://perma.cc/23CM-K3KK].
42 Population 179,154; incorporated 1636; annual budget: $696 million. Providence, RhodeIsland,
http://www.city-data.com/city/Providence-Rhode-Island.html
CITY-DATA.COM,
[https-//perma.cc/QLW3-TWQE ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) (indicating population and founding
year); APPROVED BUDGET REVENUE & EXPENDITURES OF THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2016 (2016), https*//www.providenceri.com/efile/6252
[https://perma.cc/8FEM-ECJA] (indicating budget).
423 The State Role in Local GovernmentFinancialDistress, supra note 23, at 39.
44Id.
at 19, 39.
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municipalities using state funds.42 5 To determine whether a bailout is necessary,
Rhode Island has set up monitoring mechanisms that trigger state action whenever
a municipality indicates that it cannot pay its debts.4 2
Providence is one of the oldest cities in the United States.427 The city has had a
home rule charter since 1980; however, Rhode Island's constitution makes clear
that home rule entities do not have the powers to levy, assess and collect taxes or to
borrow money, except as authorized by the state's General Assembly.4 2
Providence's age is reflected in its local economy, which is based on shipping of
petroleum products, cement, and timber, as well as manufacturing. 429 Providence
has experienced similar challenges as many of the older industrial cities across the
United States, including Utica and Niagara Falls.'" Providence has been shedding
manufacturing jobs in recent years, although the city has increased employment in
certain other sectors.' Still, Providence's population remains predominantly lowincome, and declining real estate values have made it difficult for city leaders to
increase revenue based on taxes and fees alone.
Poor decision-making from city officials has also contributed to Providence's
problems. One analysis suggests that officials needed to cut spending and make
other budget adjustments years ago to avoid the current pension underfunding
problems that plague the city.432 Yet, Providence's government has engaged in
largely unchecked spending, and corruption among local officials has been
rampant.433 Thus, in 2013, Providence faced a $900 million shortfall in funding
pensions and other post-employment benefits,434 combined with a $30 million
deficit in education funding.435 Recent litigation has brought newfound attention to

425

Id
Frost, supra note 19, at 837 n.93.
'
See Mayor Jorge 0. Elorza, Welcome to Providence!, PROVIDENCERI.COM,
https://www.providenceri.com/ [https*//perma.cc/9B4V-YU6Y] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
428 Charter Rcview Commission, PROVIDENCERI.COM, https://www.providenceri.com/cityderk/charter-review-commission [https://perma.cc/6JZS-DHH8] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017); R.I.
CONST. art. XII, § 5.
426

42 OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND, RELATING TO
$39,345,000 GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, SERIES 2013A, A-1 (2013), emma.msrb.org/ER656336-

ER509094-ER911803.pdf [https//perma.cc/HUY2-2L3Q] [hereinafter OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF
THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE].

' Vey, supra note 416.
OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE, supra note 429, at A-2
432 See Taveras Announces Action Plan in Face offiJscal Emergency, PROVIDENCERI.COM (Mar.
3,
2011),
http-//www.providenceri.com/mayor/taveras-announces-action-plan-in-face-of-fiscal
[https//perma.cc/Y2FS-BBFHI.
4 Michael G. Riley, Riley. Leaders Silent on "Enron-esque"Providence Pension Debacle,
GOLOCALPROV (May 12, 2015), http://www.golocalprov.com/news/riley-leaders-silent-on-enronesque-providence-pension-debacle [https*//perma.ccL64V-4QX6].
4 OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE, supra note 429, at A-23 (this shortfall
was calculated as of the most recent valuation at the time, which was from June 30,2011).
1s Idat A-10.
43
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the pension system, attention that some consider welcomed to the extent closer
monitoring reduces incentives for corruption.436
Since the 2013 events, Providence has been able to reach a pension reform
agreement and has reduced its unfunded pension liability to $831 million.437 The
city has met about 97% of its required contribution, and the mayor has introduced
a new plan for economic development.4 38
In 2012, the Providence Housing Authority was the subject of a scandal. The
former executive director offered no-bid contracts and mismanaged payroll funds
on top of sexual harassment charges.439 Although the Housing Authority is a city
department, it receives federal funding." 0
Governance issues were a primary contributor to Providence's pension crisis,
and although reforms have allowed the city to stand on firmer financial footing, it
remains to be seen whether Providence will someday need more concrete assistance
from the state of Rhode Island.

436 See Stephen Beale, Exclusive: Providence Unfunded Pension Liabilty Now at Least $831M,
GOLOCALPROV (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.golocalprov.com/news/exdusive-providence-unfundedRebecca Moore, City's
[https-//perma.cc/MU6B-476B];
pension-liability-now-at-least-831m/
Retirement Plan Claims Against Buck Dismissed, PLANSPONSOR (Nov. 18, 2015),
http://www.plansponsor.com/Citys-Retirement-Plan-Claims-Against-Buck-Dismissed/fulstory-true
[https://perma.cc/3NS7-3VTH].
47 OFFICIAL STATEMENT OF THE CITY OF PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND RELATING TO
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SERIES

2014A,

A-20

(2014),

emma.msrb.org/EA612863-EA479688-EA876224.pdf [https-//perma.cc/P95D-DPJN].
43 Id. at A-20, A-21.
4 Dan McGowan, Exclusive: Feds Question Jobs & No-Bid Contracts at Providence Housing,
GOLOCALPROV (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.golocalprov.com/news/pha2 [httpsi//perma.cc/BV3WBWU6].
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